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The difficulties of intercultural negotiations are well established, yet few 
studies have examined the factors that facilitate the successful resolution of these 
disputes. This research took a dynamic approach and examined the types of mediation 
tactics that are most effective in intercultural disputes given specific disputant 
characteristics. One-hundred and ten participants from the United States and Turkey 
negotiated a community-based dispute using a newly developed virtual lab. Dyads 
were randomly assigned to negotiate with a formulative computer mediator, a 
manipulative computer mediator, or in an unmediated control condition. As predicted, 
the results showed a significant interaction between manipulative mediation and 
dispute difficulty; manipulative mediation produced better objective and subjective 
outcomes in dyads that reported difficult disputing conditions than in dyads with 
  
favorable conditions. The results support the contingency approach using two new 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
With the current trend towards globalization, individuals are thrust into situations 
in which they must communicate and solve problems with people from a variety of 
cultures. Globalization has increased contact between individuals from diverse cultural 
backgrounds in diplomatic, military, business, organizational, and community settings, 
bringing with it a heightened occurrence of intercultural conflicts and disputes. While the 
issues at stake in these conflicts may be no different from those that occur between 
individuals from the same culture, intercultural disputes are plagued by additional 
difficulties stemming from cultural differences in conflict styles (Hammer, 2005; 
Kimmel, 2000). While theories and research enumerating the difficulties associated with 
intercultural disputes abound (e.g., Brett, 2001; Kimmel, 2000), scant attention has been 
paid to the factors that facilitate the resolution of intercultural disputes. 
In spite of the dearth of literature on the topic, mediation may provide a uniquely 
successful method of dealing with these difficult conflicts. People from certain cultural 
backgrounds may be hesitant to attempt to resolve a dispute directly; for example, 
disputants from collectivistic cultures may prefer to use third party intermediaries rather 
than attempting to resolve the conflict through direct communication with the other 
individual (Leung, 1988). In other words, because of cultural norms regarding the 
expectation that a conflict should not be addressed without a third party, some 
intercultural disputes may never be resolved without the intervention of a mediator. 
Mediators may also provide a unique outside perspective that can help identify issues 
stemming from cultural differences that the disputants themselves may not recognize. 




behave, and these expectations are shaped by cultural background (Kimmel, 2000). In an 
intercultural dispute, these expectations may be mismatched, leading to 
misunderstandings between the disputants. Mediators may possess a unique perspective 
from which they can identify the source of misunderstandings between disputants and 
create a “microculture” that allows disputants to share norms, expectations, and 
perceptions of the interaction (Kimmel, 2000, p. 453).  
Given the added difficulty associated with intercultural disputes and the unique 
potential of third parties to bring about positive outcomes in these situations, it is crucial 
that researchers and practitioners consider the relationships between conflict, culture, and 
mediation. However, while theory and research on conflict and negotiation has expanded 
to explore the role of culture (e.g., Gelfand & Brett, 2004), including intercultural 
disputes (e.g., Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), research on culture and conflict has 
generally not examined mediation in intercultural disputes. And while the field of 
mediation has also been extremely productive, it has generally ignored issues of culture 
and the mediation of intercultural disputes (for exceptions, see the work of Cohen, 1996 
on culture in international mediation, and Wall & colleagues, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997, 
1999, 2004, on mediation tactics across cultures). The current study locates itself at the 
intersection of culture, conflict, and mediation to begin exploring this understudied area.  
This research examines the questions: Which mediation styles are most effective 
in managing intercultural disputes, and are there situational factors that make certain 
styles more or less effective in this context? Researchers investigating mediation have 
catalogued and organized tactics into clusters based on reports from professional, 
community, and managerial third parties (Beardsley, Quinn, Biswas, & Wilkenfeld, 




Lim, 1991). In addition, previous research in both psychology and political science has 
supported the notion that mediators select styles to use based on dispute characteristics, 
such as disputant resistance to mediation, hostility between the disputants, and low 
disputant trust (Carnevale, 1986; Lim & Carnevale, 1990). Further, style effectiveness is 
contingent on these characteristics; some styles are more effective in certain disputing 
contexts than others (Lim & Carnevale, 1990). Though the contingent effectiveness of 
these styles is strongly supported, there has yet to be any research on whether the 
contingency approach operates in intercultural disputes and how the cultural composition 
of disputing dyads may act as an additional factor impacting the effectiveness of 
mediation styles. The current research seeks to begin filling this gap.  
In what follows, I first provide a review of the literature on mediation and 
mediation tactics, focusing on the previously established organizing taxonomies of these 
tactics and providing justification of the mediation styles selected for the current 
investigation. Second, I review previous theoretical and empirical support for the 
contingent use and effectiveness of mediation tactics in intracultural disputes. I go on to 
describe the unique challenges of intercultural disputes to suggest that the cultural context 
may pose as a previously unexplored contingency impacting mediation style 
effectiveness. Fourth, I present three hypotheses. I then present the methods employed to 
test these hypotheses, followed by a presentation of the results. I conclude with a review 







General Review of Mediation Theory, Tactics, and Styles 
 
The following section will provide a brief introduction to the concept of 
mediation and a review of basic mediation tactics. The discussion will move to discuss a 
theoretically and empirically supported taxonomy that groups these tactics into mediation 
styles, with an eye toward motivating the selection of the styles used in the current study 
of intercultural disputes. The section will also provide a brief review of the replication of 
these two styles in multiple cultures to justify their appropriateness for use in an 
intercultural study.  
Mediation is defined as:  
A process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, 
or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization 
to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to 
physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991, p. 8).  
 
Mediation has been found to have many benefits for the management of disputes, 
including improved settlement rates (Wilkenfeld, Young, Asal, & Quinn, 2003), 
increased disputant satisfaction with outcome (Depner, Cannata, & Ricci, 1994; 
Wilkenfeld et al., 2003), and more durable settlements (Elleman, 1997). 
Mediator Tactics 
Discussions of mediation tactics and techniques abound in the literature (for a 
comprehensive list of tactics, see Wall, 1981). Though each tactic may fulfill multiple 
mediator goals, tactics are generally assumed to address one of four areas of the dispute 
(Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). The first area that mediators must confront is the relationship 
between the disputants, which involves managing the communication, perceptions, and 




1981; Wall, Stark, & Standifer, 2001). Another area is the relationship between the 
mediator and the disputants, which is managed using tactics designed to gain disputants’ 
trust and underscore the importance of their participation (Kressel & Pruitt, 1985; Wall, 
1981). The third and final relational aspect of mediation is the affiliation of the disputants 
with their respective parties or constituencies, which requires mediators to help 
disputants maintain positive relationships with their constituents (Wall, 1981). While 
relational concerns are important influences on the process of mediation, the final aspect 
of the mediation process that must be addressed is the dispute itself. To do so, mediators 
may establish ground rules for the negotiation or provide information to the parties 
(Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Wall, 1981). Mediators may also subtly or explicitly influence 
the resolution of the dispute by suggesting potential settlements, punishing the disputants 
for failing to reach an agreement, or rewarding disputants for concessions (Wall et al., 
2001; Wall & Lynn, 1993).  
Dimensions of Mediator Tactics 
While taxonomies of mediation tactics based on intuition or personal experience 
are common, Kressel and Pruitt's (1985) categorization of tactics is one of the few that 
has been empirically tested and supported. In this taxonomy, interventions are labeled as 
reflexive, contextual, or substantive, and within each type of intervention, tactics vary 
along an assertive-passive dimension. Reflexive interventions include the tactics 
mediators use "to orient themselves to the dispute and to establish the groundwork upon 
which their later activities will be built" (p. 188), such as building the disputants trust in 
the mediator and gathering information. Contextual interventions are those that "alter the 




solving" (p. 191), and include tactics such as dealing with disputants' anger and 
structuring the agenda. Substantive interventions are those "by which the mediator deals 
directly with the issues in the dispute" (p. 192). Substantive interventions include tactics 
such as identifying areas of compromise, suggesting solutions, and helping the disputants 
evaluate potential agreements. Kressel and Pruitt’s (1985) taxonomy provides theoretical 
support for the clustering of mediation tactics into a substantive style, but does not 
account for the possibility of a separate style or substyle for more forceful or pressing 
tactics, such as punishing the disputants or offering rewards for concessions.  
McLaughlin et al. (1991) provided evidence for the separation of substantive 
tactics into separate substyles. In their examination of professional mediators' 
categorization of common tactics, 54 mediators sorted 36 tactics into mutually exclusive 
categories, which were analyzed using multidimensional scaling and cluster analyses. 
The multidimensional scaling analyses supported Kressel and Pruitt's (1985) distinction 
between substantive and reflexive interventions, as well as the existence of an assertive-
passive dimension cutting across each category. The cluster analyses uncovered four 
general clusters. The first and second clusters corresponded with Kressel and Pruitt's 
reflexive and contextual interventions. The remaining two clusters were made up of 
substantive factors. The first of these two clusters, the Maneuvering cluster, involved 
substantive tactics designed to alter the disputants' positions and was further divided into 
two subclusters. The first subcluster within Maneuvering, labeled Make Suggestions, 
included behaviors designed to offer specific suggestions to the disputants to move them 
to a new position, such as suggesting a particular settlement and discussing potential 
settlements. Pressing, the second Maneuvering subcluster, was comprised of tactics 




costs of disagreement and pressing disputants hard to make a compromise. The second of 
the two substantive clusters, the Facilitating cluster, involved tactics related to 
"facilitating or controlling communication between disputants" (McLaughlin et al., 1991, 
p. 470). In summary, McLaughlin et al.’s analyses uncovered separate clusters of 
substantive tactics; Make suggestions, which included only proposing and discussing 
settlement options, and Pressing, which included more forceful tactics used to push 
disputants to an agreement. 
In addition to McLaughlin et al.’s (1991) multidimensional scaling and cluster 
analysis study, Lim and Carnevale’s (1990) factor analysis of mediators’ reported use of 
tactics also supports the existence of separate suggesting and pressing styles. In this 
study, 255 professional mediators reported on several aspects of their most recently 
completed mediation case, including the tactics they used. Lim and Carnevale (1990) 
factor analyzed the mediators’ reported tactic use. The final model was a six-factor 
solution. The factor analysis uncovered three subcategories of substantive interventions. 
Two of these factors, Substantive/Suggestions and Substantive/Press were consistent with 
McLaughlin et al.’s (1991) Make Suggestions and Pressing subclusters of the 
Maneuvering cluster, respectively. The final substantive factor uncovered by Lim and 
Carnevale (1990) was Substantive/Face-Saving, and included tactics that helped 
disputants save face during the negotiations. In addition, there was a clear reflexive 
category. The contextual category of behavior was split into a trust factor, which included 
activities meant to build trust between the actors in the dispute, and an agenda factor, 
which covered tactics meant to control the agenda. Lim and Carnevale’s analysis 





Taken together, the results from McLaughlin et al.’s (1991) multidimensional 
scaling and cluster analysis and Lim and Carnevale’s (1990) factor analysis support the 
existence of separate substantive clusters related to making suggestions and pressing the 
disputants. These two styles are also consistent with previous theoretical perspectives of 
mediator behavior in political science. Touval and Zartman (1985) define three mediator 
roles. The first role, the mediator as facilitator or communicator, corresponds with both 
the reflexive and contextual styles (Touval & Zartman, 1985; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). 
The remaining two roles reflect two of the subcategories included in the substantive type. 
In the mediator as formulator role, the mediator contributes to the negotiations by 
developing and providing potential solutions to the disputants (Touval & Zartman, 1985; 
Wilkenfeld et al., 2003); this role corresponds with the Maneuvering: Make Suggestions 
subcluster and Substantive/Suggestions factor. Finally, the mediator as manipulator role 
involves both providing potential solutions and “[manipulating] the parties into 
agreement” (Touval & Zartman, 1985, p. 12) by using their power, position, or influence 
to change the appeal of a given solution (Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). The manipulator role is 
generally characterized by the use of threats, rewards, and punishments, called “carrot 
and stick” measures, to aggressively push for a solution. The studies conducted by 
McLaughlin et al. (1991) and Lim and Carnevale (1990) did not include these carrot and 
stick measures, likely because professional mediators in industrial, organizational, and 
community disputes often do not have the necessary power to exact such tactics 
(Hopmann, 1996). However, the manipulator role shares key aspects of the 
Substantive/Press factor and Maneuvering: Pressing subcluster, including pressing 




trying to move disputants off a position, and making the disputants aware of the costs of 
nonagreement (Beardsley et al., 2006; Lim & Carnevale, 1990; McLaughlin et al., 1991).  
Additional support for the investigation of the formulative/make suggestions and 
manipulative/pressing styles of mediator behavior in the current study is provided by 
studies of intracultural mediation in non-Western nations. While there is considerable 
variability in mediation practices across cultures (e.g., Callister & Wall, 1997; Callister 
and Wall, 2004; Davidhesier, 2005; Kim, Wall, Sohn, & Kim, 1993; Wall & Blum, 1991; 
Wall, Callister, & Callister, 1999), there may also be commonalities that indicate a core 
of universal techniques (Carnevale, Cha, Wan, & Fraidin, 2004; Dialdin & Wall, 1999; 
LeResche, 1992). Previous research has suggested that making suggestions and using 
pressing techniques may be core universal techniques, in that mediators involved in 
disputes at a variety of levels from Malaysia (Wall, Callister, & Callister, 1999), Thailand 
(Callister & Wall, 2004), China (Wall & Blum, 1991), Japan (Callister & Wall, 1997), 
South Korea (Kim et al, 1993), Turkey (Kozan & Ilter, 1994), and Gambia (Davidhesier, 
2005) reported both proposing solutions to disputants and pushing them hard to an 
agreement. Since the current paper focuses on intercultural disputes, it is important to 
select mediation styles that are deployed effectively in a variety of cultural contexts. 
Based on the theoretical support for and empirical stability of the formulative and 
manipulative styles of mediator intervention, the current research will focus on the 
effectiveness of these two styles in intercultural disputes. The clustering of tactics within 
the reflexive and contextual styles was not consistent between McLaughlin et al. (1991) 
and Lim and Carnevale (1990), making it difficult to clearly determine the tactics 
included in each style. Given that there are also inconsistencies in the theoretical 




reflexive categories are separate styles, these two groups of mediator behavior are not 
tested in the current research. I return to the importance of future research on these styles 
in the discussion section. The two styles of mediation used in the current study are 
defined as such: 
Formulative (aka “make suggestions” mediation): a collection of tactics 
employed by a mediator to move a party onto a new position by making 
specific, substantive contributions to the negotiations 
 
Manipulative (aka “pressing” mediation): a collection of tactics employed 
by a mediator to move a party off a previous held position or push the 
parties toward settlement by threatening, punishing, or rewarding one or 
both disputants. 
The Contingency Approach to Mediation 
With the goal of understanding how mediators mediate, recent research has 
developed, tested, and refined a contingency theory of mediation. This theory posits that 
mediators base their selection of styles on observations of various aspects of the situation, 
such as disputant hostility, and that these factors in turn impact the effectiveness of 
mediation styles (e.g., Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985; 
Hiltrop, 1985; Lim & Carnevale, 1990). The basis of contingent theory is the assumption 
that “in order to be effective, the mediator must choose a strategy responsive to the 
dispute situation” (Hiltrop, 1985, p. 93). Previous research has largely supported this 
assumption, finding that the effectiveness of mediation tactics and styles is dependent on 




1990). Due to the focus of the current research on the formulative and manipulative 
mediation styles, the following review of contingencies in mediation will focus 
specifically on the disputing context(s) in which these styles are used and the 
effectiveness of these styles in different situations.  
The relationship between difficult dispute conditions and the effectiveness of 
manipulative techniques has been supported by a number of theoretical perspectives and 
field studies (e.g., Bercovitch, 1997; Hiltrop, 1985, 1989; Kleiboer, 1996; Rubin, 1980; 
Wilkenfeld et al., 2003). Rubin (1980) and Donohue (1989) noted that forceful tactics 
were often ineffective or even counterproductive in low-intensity disputes, in which 
disputants were likely to be resentful of the mediators’ attempts to control the 
negotiation. In contrast, they argued that forceful tactics would be especially effective in 
high-intensity disputes, as disputants could blame concessions on mediator pressure and 
thus save face. Likewise, Bercovitch (1997) and Wilkenfeld et al. (2003) argued that 
disputants are more receptive to formulative and manipulative mediation during intense 
crisis situations rather than in lower-intensity contexts.  
In field work on the contingent effectiveness of mediation styles, Hiltrop (1985) 
investigated the effectiveness of mediator strategies in collective bargaining disputes. 
This research showed that the use of forceful tactics was positively related to settlement 
by mediation when a strike action had been imposed, but did not impact settlement when 
strikes had not been imposed. These findings suggest that directive and forceful 
behaviors may be more likely to lead to settlements, but only when the interpersonal 
relationship between disputing parties is negative and the dispute is intense. Hiltrop also 
found that directive strategies were positively related to settlement in disputes over issues 




suggested that disputes over principles rather than tangible, “more compromisable” issues 
like pay may require more force on the part of the mediator, especially to move 
disputants off of their positions. This finding speaks to the possibility that deeply-held 
disputant principles may increase the intensity of the dispute situation and harm the 
relationship between disputants due to refusals to compromise. In addition, Zubek and 
colleagues (1992) found that when joint problem solving was low and disputants had a 
contentious relationship, mediator efforts to suggest new solutions were positively related 
to settlement. In contrast, when joint problem solving was high, the same mediator 
behavior was negatively related to agreement.  
In the most comprehensive investigation of contingencies in mediation style 
selection and effectiveness, Lim and Carnevale (1990) linked professional mediators’ 
reports of the disputing context in their most recently completed case to the use and 
effectiveness of mediation styles. As in previous field research, mediators reported using 
manipulative mediation to a greater extent in hostile disputes, which included conditions 
of low contextualized trust (i.e., low trust between the disputants) and refusal to 
compromise. In addition, the effectiveness of manipulative mediation was moderated by 
difficult conditions, which included hostility, internal party problems (lack of disputant 
preparation or experience), and resistance to mediation (low trust in the mediator, high 
desire for control over negotiation). Under these difficult conditions, manipulative 
mediation was positively related to desired outcomes, but the relationship between 
manipulative mediation and outcomes was negative under conditions of low difficulty. 
For example, under high hostility, manipulative mediation was positively related to the 
achievement of a general settlement and an improved disputant relationship, but this 




manipulative mediation is effective under difficult conditions, but may be 
counterproductive when conditions are more favorable. 
Lim & Carnevale’s (1990) results regarding formulative mediation were less 
consistent. First, dispute hostility was not related to the selection of formulative tactics, 
but hostility did interact with formulative mediation to predict outcomes. As with 
manipulative mediation, formulative mediation was positively related to the achievement 
of a general settlement and improved disputant relationship under conditions of high 
hostility, but negatively related to these outcomes under low hostility. Internal party 
problems also moderated the relationship between formulative mediation and general 
settlement. However, in a reversal of the pattern found for hostility, under a low degree of 
internal party problems, the relationship between formulative mediation and settlement 
was positive, but as the degree of internal party problems increased, this relationship 
switched from positive to negative. In sum, while formulative mediation interacted with 
difficult conditions, the pattern of the interactions was not consistent; in the case of 
hostility, formulative mediation performed better under difficult conditions, but in the 
case of internal party problems, formulative mediation performed worse under difficult 
conditions. These findings suggest that the relationship between formulative mediation 
and outcomes is not consistent across different types of dispute difficulty. 
Taken together, previous theoretical and field work on the contingent use and 
effectiveness of formulative and manipulative strategies supports the idea that 
manipulative mediation may be effective only in situations where dispute intensity is 
high, the disputant relationship is contentious, or when joint problem-solving is low 
(Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). In contrast, these strategies are ineffective and even 




remains limited in several ways. Most of the studies on the contingency theory have 
relied entirely on reports from mediators in the field, and have gathered data on all 
variables (dispute characteristics, mediation style, and outcomes) from the mediator 
alone. In particular, these studies have relied on mediators’ reports of their use of tactics; 
to date, there is no research examining the interaction between difficult conditions and 
mediation style when disputes are randomly assigned to a mediation style. Further, the 
contingency approach has not been tested when mediators were limited to using only one 
style during the dispute, or in a study that included an adequate control condition of no 
mediation. Finally, the theory and literature on the contingent effectiveness of mediation 
has not considered the cultural context of the dispute. The following section will 
enumerate the difficulties that may arise in intercultural disputes to suggest that cultural 
difference may be a previously unexplored dispute characteristic that may moderate the 
effectiveness of mediation styles.  
Difficulties of Intercultural Disputes 
 
While all disputes and conflicts have their difficulties, disputes between parties 
from different cultures may be prone to unique challenges, especially if the disputants’ 
cultures are very different. Hofstede (1980) defined culture as “the collective 
programming of the mind,” which distinguishes human groups from one another and 
influences how they respond to their respective environments (p. 25). Similarly, the 
GLOBE study defined culture as common practices and common values (House & 
Javidan, 2004). Triandis (1972) focused on subjective culture, which is a society's 
"characteristic way of perceiving its social environment" (p. 3), including the 




members. While there is variation in the definitions of culture, many perspectives point to 
the shared nature of culture, its ability to impart adaptive (or once adaptive) knowledge, 
and its transmission across time and generation (Triandis, Kurowski, & Gelfand, 1994).  
Previous research has suggested that culture and negotiation are inextricably 
linked, in that culture shapes negotiator interests, priorities, and strategies (e.g., Adair, 
Brett, Lempereur,  Okumura, Tinsley, & Lytle, 1998; Avruch, 2003; Avruch & Black, 
1991; Brett, 2000, 2001; Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikirev, Tinsley et al., 
1998; Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Gelfand & Christakopolou, 1999; Gelfand, Higgins, Nishii, 
Raver, Dominguez, Yamaguchi, et al.,  2002; Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, Dyer, Ohbuchi, 
& Fukumo, 2001; Hammer, 2005; Imai & Gelfand, 2009). Culture forms the foundations 
of disputant expectations for behavior during the conflict (Kimmel, 2000; Ting-Toomey 
& Oetzel, 2001); when these expectations are not shared between disputants or when one 
party deviates from the other party’s expectations, a unique set of challenges is layered 
over the original conflict. The following section will enumerate a number of previously 
supported cultural differences that come to bear during negotiations and offer potential 
mechanisms by which these cultural differences increase the difficulty of finding 
resolution in intercultural disputes. 
One key area in which cultures differ is the metaphors used to think about 
negotiation (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). Metaphors are “sets of conceptual mappings 
that take place between domains of experience” (p. 298). Though the function of 
metaphors is universal, the content is culture specific. Metaphors for negotiation provide 
actors with information on the nature of the disputing task, how they should behave in the 




metaphors provide a lens through which disputing parties understand the conflict and a 
filter that affects their behavior during the dispute.  
Difficulties may arise when disputants hold different metaphors for negotiation, 
which is likely when the disputing parties are from different cultures. For example, a 
sports metaphor is commonly held by American negotiators, whereas an ie, or household, 
metaphor is commonly held by Japanese negotiators (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). In an 
intercultural dispute between an American disputant and a Japanese disputant, these 
divergent metaphors may lead to a different understanding of the negotiation task as well 
as to different behaviors and reactions during the task. Whereas the American disputant 
might view conflict as a normal activity characterized by overt, task-oriented behaviors, 
the Japanese disputant would likely view conflict as an activity to be avoided and only 
addressed through covert, relationally-oriented behaviors. Similarly, the American-held 
sports metaphor may result in negotiation behavior that is aggressive and exchanged in 
turns, whereas the Japanese household metaphor may lead to lower aggression and 
activities determined by status and needs. Based on this example, it is clear that divergent 
metaphors, such as those that may be held by disputants from different cultures, may 
create conflicting expectations about the negotiating task and process. These divergent 
expectations may hinder the disputants’ ability to coordinate joint problem solving and 
may produce behaviors that violate expectations for behavior. 
A second way in which culture affects negotiation is through communication. 
While communication strategies can be linked to metaphors, cultural differences in norms 
for communication cut across many different situations. Two primary systems of 
communication norms are particularly relevant for the impact of culture in disputing 




they favor high or low context communication. In high context communication “most of 
the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person” whereas in 
low context communication most of the information is “in the coded, explicit, transmitted 
part of the message (Hall, 1976, p. 91). For example, Hall (1976) posited that Japanese, 
Chinese, Arabic, and Mediterranean languages are often high-context, whereas German, 
English, and Northern European languages are low-context. The high-low context 
distinction is particularly relevant for communication over conflict. Low-context 
negotiators may emphasize using explicit, direct, and unambiguous language to clearly 
express their position, while high-context negotiators may try to use indirect, ambiguous 
communication approaches to try to express their true intentions (Hammer 1997, 2005; 
Ting-Toomey, 1985, 1988). 
The second system of communication norms that impacts negotiation concerns 
the expression of emotion in verbal and non-verbal behaviors. There are differences in 
cultural norms regarding the expression of emotion (Ekman & Frisen, 1969), especially 
during social interactions (Hammer, 2005). For example, Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner (1998) found that the majority of respondents in Poland, Japan, and Ethiopia 
reported that they would not express emotions openly if they felt upset at work, whereas 
the majority of respondents from Kuwait, Egypt, Oman, Spain, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, and the Philippines indicated that they would openly express their feelings. 
Members of cultures where emotional restraint is valued tend to avoid overt expressions 
of emotion by containing, hiding, or masking their feelings (Hammer, 2005). In contrast, 
emotionally expressive cultures express their emotions through both verbal and non-
verbal behaviors, including gestures, voice volume, and posture (Hammer, 2005; 




The cultural differences in metaphors and communication norms establish 
expectations and behavioral patterns that impact the negotiation context. While there may 
be variation within a culture in the extent to which individual negotiators hold the same 
metaphor for negotiation or adhere to the same communication norms (Brett, 2001), there 
is a strong relationship between common culture and shared mindsets regarding disputes 
and negotiations (Kimmel, 2000). In addition to cultural differences in metaphors and 
communication norms, intercultural disputes may also be complicated by more diffuse 
cultural differences that impact expectations of conflicts and their resolution (Ting-
Toomey & Oetzel, 2001), such as value patterns (e.g., individualism-collectivism and 
power distance, Hofstede, 1980), conflict norms (e.g., equity vs. communal norms, Leung 
& Bond, 1984; Leung & Iwawaki, 1988), and face concerns (Condon, 1984, Ting-
Toomey, 1988). Disputants from the same or similar cultures share similar 
understandings of what conflict means and the appropriate behavior for addressing it; in 
contrast, disputants from different cultures often do not share the unconscious 
expectations, norms for behavior, and communication styles that guide behavior in 
conflict situations (Kimmel, 2000). These divergences may lead to “surprises” during the 
dispute (Cohen, 1991), in that one disputant will likely violate the other disputant’s 
expectations (Kimmel, 2000).  
These violations may not only disrupt the coordination of behaviors and 
communication during the dispute, but may also lead to negative assumptions about the 
violators’ behavior and intentions. Previous research has suggested that people 
unconsciously assume mindsets congruent with their culture (Glenn, 1962), and assume 
that their expectations and behavior are correct (Kimmel, 2000). When a person violates 




motivations (e.g., “he’s lazy” or “she’s trying to be evasive”) rather than to cultural 
differences in acceptable behavior or communication during disputes (Cohen, 1991; 
Kimmel, 2000; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). Such negative attributions may damage 
the perceiver’s motivation to continue in the resolution process; the perception that the 
violator is behaving in a hostile or contentious manner decreases efforts to engage in joint 
problem-solving (Zubek et al., 1992). In addition, if the negative attributions are 
communicated to the violator, they may decrease his or her receptivity to the other 
disputant (Kimmel, 2000). Thus, cultural differences not only make it difficult to 
coordinate behavior and expectations, but violations may lead to negative attributional 
processes that damage the relationship between disputants and may lead to lower 
receptivity and increased hostility.  
The potential for negative outcomes in intercultural dyads may be further 
amplified by stereotypes (Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). For example, negative 
attributions are related to the commonly held beliefs within a culture (Kimmel, 2000). 
Behavior exhibited by a disputant is judged based on the stereotypes held by the other 
party about that behavior; for example, a disputant who negotiates at a slower pace may 
be labeled as lazy by an American disputing partner, because slower paces are associated 
with laziness in the American cultural context. Stereotypes of the opposing disputant’s 
culture may also negatively impact the negotiation process. Disputants from cultures that 
share common norms and behavioral scripts for negotiation may not recognize these 
similarities if they hold cultural stereotypes that label the opposing disputant’s culture as 
very different from their own (Brett, 2000). In addition, even if a disputant tries to deviate 
from the stereotypically held beliefs about how members of his or her culture behave 




disputant’s behavior seriously (Brett, 2001). Thus, while some theorists suggest creating 
a “microculture” in which negotiators adapt to each other to form a common approach to 
the negotiation (e.g., Drake & Donohue, 1996; Kimmel, 2000; Pinkley & Northcraft, 
1994), these adaptations may be challenging to achieve in real negotiations (Brett, 2000), 
perhaps in part because of the difficulty in overcoming cultural stereotypes.  
 In sum, previous research has suggested that there are fundamental cultural 
differences in the expectations, values, interests, and norms surrounding negotiation. The 
variation in the approaches to negotiation results in unexpected behavior and potential 
violations of norms and expectations. Violations, in turn, may lead to negative 
attributional judgments and may be exacerbated by cultural stereotypes. The differences 
in expectations between disputants from different cultures, as well as their divergent 
negotiation communication and behavior, hinder coordination and joint problem-solving. 
In addition, through stereotyping and attributional processes, these factors may increase 
feelings of contention between the disputants, thus escalating the intensity of the dispute 
and decreasing the disputants’ desire to reach a settlement.  Given the previous research 
on contingencies in mediation and the added difficulties of intercultural disputes, the 
current paper argues that the cultural context of a dispute, specifically whether it takes 
place in an intercultural context, may act as a contextual variable affecting the success of 
mediation styles. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the previous research testing contingencies in mediation, it is expected 




to concede, and low openness to mediation) will impact the effectiveness of mediation 
styles in intercultural disputes.  
Hypothesis 1: There will be a significant interaction between manipulative 
mediation and measures of dispute difficulty. Manipulative mediation will 
produce better outcomes in difficult conditions, but worse outcomes in 
easier conditions.  
Hypothesis 1a: There will be a significant interaction between 
manipulative mediation and contextualized trust. Manipulative 
mediation will produce better outcomes when dyads report low 
contextualized trust, but worse outcomes when dyads report higher 
contextualized trust. 
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a significant interaction between 
manipulative mediation and willingness to concede. Manipulative 
mediation will produce better outcomes when dyads report low 
willingness to concede, but worse outcomes when dyads are more 
willingness to concede. 
Hypothesis 1c: There will be a significant interaction between 
manipulative mediation and openness to mediation. Manipulative 
mediation will produce better outcomes when dyads report low 
openness to mediation, but worse outcomes when dyads are more open 
to mediation. 
Given the previously discussed inconsistencies regarding the interaction between 




current study does not offer any specific predictions regarding the behavior of 
formulative mediation. 
 The current study will also explore the impact of two previously unexplored 
measures of dispute difficulty, generalized trust and cultural intelligence, on the 
effectiveness of mediation styles. Generalized trust is an “[acceptance of] vulnerability 
based on positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). Contextualized trust is based on disputant reports 
of trust in the other disputant to behave appropriately in the specific context of the 
negotiation. Generalized trust is less concrete and specific in its target, and is thus less 
contingent on the specific situation (Gheorgihui, Vignoles, & Smith, 2009). Previous 
research has suggested that people with higher generalized trust are more likely to 
perceive others, even strangers, as trustworthy and may be more likely to trust them in 
specific situations (Gheorghiu et al., 2009); thus, I expect that low generalized trust may 
impact the effectiveness of mediation styles in a similar manner as contextualized trust.  
Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant interaction between manipulative 
mediation and generalized trust. Manipulative mediation will produce 
better outcomes when dyads report low generalized trust, but worse 
outcomes when dyads are more trusting. 
One individual difference factor that may help to overcome the difficulties of 
intercultural disputes is cultural intelligence (CQ), which is an individual’s capacity to 
function and manage in culturally diverse situations (Earley & Ang, 2003). CQ is 
comprised of four dimensions. Metacognitive CQ refers to an individual’s level of 
awareness of cultural preferences and norms during intercultural interactions (Ang & Van 




conventions, while Motivational CQ refers to an individual’s drive to learn about and 
function in situations with culturally diverse people (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). Finally, 
Behavioral CQ is a measure of an individual’s ability to appropriately display verbal and 
nonverbal signals in cross-cultural situations (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008). CQ has received 
attention for its theoretical potential to smooth relations in intercultural interactions 
(Brislin, Worthley, & MacNab, 2006), and it has been shown to improve performance 
and adjustment in intercultural situations (Ang, Van Dyne, Koh, Ng, Templer, & Tay, 
2007; Flaherty, 2008). CQ has also been linked to performance in intercultural 
negotiations. Imai and Gelfand (2010) found that motivational CQ predicted integrative 
information sequences in intercultural negotiations, which in turn positively predicted 
joint outcomes. This research suggests that CQ, particularly motivational CQ, may help 
to ameliorate the difficulties of intercultural disputes. As such, CQ may be another 
contingency affecting the effectiveness of mediation styles in intercultural disputes. 
Intercultural disputes in which the disputants have low cultural intelligence may be more 
difficult, and thus manipulative mediation may be more effective in these situations. In 
contrast, when disputants in intercultural disputes have higher cultural intelligence, the 
disputes may be less difficult and therefore may not benefit from the pressing tactics of 
the manipulative mediator.  
Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant interaction between manipulative 
mediation and cultural intelligence. Manipulative mediation will produce 
better outcomes when dyads have low CQ scores, but worse outcomes 





The current study sought to expand the literature on the contingencies of 
mediation style effectiveness through four means. First, disputing dyads were randomly 
assigned to either negotiation in a formulative mediation, manipulative mediation, or a no 
mediation condition. In this sense, the study was similar to that of Wilkenfeld et al. 
(2003), which randomly assigned negotiating dyads to facilitative, manipulative, or no 
mediation conditions, though the current study replaces the facilitative style with the 
formulative style. Random assignment was necessary to ensure that any differences in 
outcomes are due to the effects of mediation style, and not to other factors like 
characteristics of the dispute or the negotiators.  
Second, this study standardized the mediation styles in the mediated conditions by 
employing a computer agent. While previous studies investigating mediation styles have 
generally manipulated mediation style through trained human mediators (e.g., Bartunek, 
Benton, & Keys, 1975; Kimsey, Fuller, Bell, & McKinney, 1994; Wilkenfeld et al., 
2003), computer agents have been developed and used successfully as mediators in 
computer science (Chalamish & Kraus, 2007) as well as in traditional conflict resolution 
studies (Wittmer, Carnevale, & Walker, 1991). While the use of a live mediator may 
enhance the realism of the simulation, it also requires consistent monitoring of the 
mediator behavior to ensure reliability within mediation style (as in Wilkenfeld et al., 
2003), or the delivery of pre-scripted statements at certain times during the negotiation 
(as in Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975).  
The use of a computer agent as the mediator offered several advantages. First, the 




condition, ensuring that there were no undetected differences in the how the mediation 
style was deployed across dyads. Second, the agent was able to react contingently to the 
disputants’ offer behavior while reliably maintaining the selected style. However, there 
are tradeoffs to using an agent mediator. Participants may be suspicious that the agent is 
not a real person, and the fact that the agent only sent text messages to the disputants 
rather than taking part in the discussion may have reduced the social presence of the 
mediator. The current study went to great lengths to ensure that participants believed the 
mediator was a real person and that the social presence of the mediator was sufficient to 
impact the negotiations. In addition, previous studies using agent mediators have 
suggested that only a minority of participants were suspicious of the mediator (Wittmer et 
al., 1991). 
Third, the current study used measures of difficulty collected directly from the 
disputants, rather than basing them on the mediator’s perception of dispute difficulty. As 
discussed, the current study focused on several markers of dispute difficulty. First, it 
focused on three previously utilized metrics of difficulty: contextualized trust (i.e., trust 
in the other disputant), willingness to concede, and openness to mediation. These 
measures were found in the top five most cited indicators predictive of unsuccessful 
mediation attempts in Carnevale, Putnam, Conlon, and O’Connor’s (1991) study of 
community mediation, suggesting that they are likely to be common indicators of dispute 
difficulty. The study also explored two new difficulty markers, generalized trust and 
cultural intelligence. These two difficulty markers were expected to impact mediation 
style effectiveness in the same manner as the previously explored factors.  
Fourth, the current study attempted to replicate previous findings on 




samples of American and Turkish students paired into intercultural dyads. The United 
States and Turkey were selected for the sample sites for a number of reasons. First, much 
of the research on intercultural disputes focuses on disputes occurring between 
negotiators from the West, especially from the United States, and East Asia (e.g., 
Arunachalam, Lytle, & Wall, 2001; Imai & Gelfand, 2010). Intercultural disputes 
between negotiators in the US and non-East Asian cultures have received relatively little 
attention. Second, the US and Turkey differ on a number of cultural value metrics that 
may impact negotiations. Turkey scores relatively high on collectivism, power distance, 
and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980). People in Turkey tend to value maintaining 
harmony and smooth relationships (Kozan, Ergin, & Varoglu, 2007), eschewing 
aggressive individualism and confrontational behaviors during interactions (Dindi, Gazur, 
& Kirkkopru-Dindi, 1989; Kozan et al., 2007). In contrast, individuals from the US are 
highly individualistic (Hofstede, 1980), endorse an independent self-construal (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991), and value competition (Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).  Further, 
Turkey and the United States differ on the value placed on assertiveness, with the 
GLOBE study reporting that the American sample reported significantly higher 
assertiveness values (M = 4.32) than the Turkish sample (M = 2.66; den Hartog, 2004). 
Assertiveness is linked to valuing dominant behavior, competition, and direct 
communication and expression of emotion (den Hartog, 2004). Individuals from assertive 
cultures tend to emphasize results over interpersonal relationships. In contrast, 
individuals from cultures scoring low on assertiveness tend to value cooperation, 
relationships, and indirect communication.  
The United States and Turkey also differ on institutional collectivism, or the 




Bhawuk, Nishii, & Bechtold, 2004), with Turkey scoring significantly higher (M = 5.26) 
on institutional collectivism values than the United States (M = 4.17) in the GLOBE 
study. Individualism and collectivism have been linked to a number of differences in 
negotiation behavior. Individualist tend to manage conflict using self-defensive, 
controlling, dominant, and competitive styles, while collectivists tend to rely on more 
integrative, compromising, obliging, and avoidant styles (Chau & Gudykunst, 1987; 
Ting-Toomey & Oetzel, 2001). In Turkey specifically, previous research has suggested 
that parties tend to focus on establishing relationships in negotiations, and that economic 
interests are generally pursued in a very indirect way (Kozan et al., 2007; White, 1994). 
Finally, the United States and Turkey also differ on communication norms; Turkish is 
considered a high context language, while English is considered a low context language. 
This difference impacts expectations surrounding the use of direct versus ambiguous 
communications. In sum, the United States and Turkey differ markedly on several 
cultural dimensions, and these differences were expected to affect how members of these 









Chapter 2: Methods 
Participants 
A total of 53 American students from a large, mid-Atlantic, public university and 
53 Turkish students from a small private university outside of Istanbul, Turkey 
participated in the study. Power analyses revealed that approximately 51 dyads would 
provide 85% percent power to detect large effects with the reported experimental design 
and planned regression analyses. Additional participants were recruited to ensure that a 
sufficient number of usable dyads would be available for the analyses. Participants were 
recruited through classroom announcements and on-campus flyers. Experimenters also 
approached students in public locations on the campuses and asked if they would like to 
participate. Participants received $20 USD (or equivalent) for their participation. 
The American sample included 24 male and 29 female participants between the 
ages of 18 and 45 years of age (M = 21.2, SD = 4.2). The majority of the participants 
identified themselves as European American (62.2%, n = 33), followed by Asian (20.7%, 
n = 11), African American (7.5%, n = 4), and bi- or multi racial (3.8%, n = 2). Three 
participants (5.7%) chose not indicate their ethnicity. The majority of the sample 
described their socio-economic status as middle-class (75.5%, n = 40), followed by upper 
class (15.1%, n = 8), and lower class (9.4%,     n = 5).  
The Turkish sample included 24 male and 29 female participants between the 
ages of 18 and 30 (M = 21.6, SD = 2.5). Participants in the Turkish sample were not 
asked to indicate their ethnicity; based on collaborator feedback, the ethnicity question 
was removed from the Turkish demographics questionnaire due to its potential to cause 




as middle class (62.2%, n = 33), followed by lower class (40.0%, n = 18), and upper class 
(5.7%, n = 3). 
Design and Procedure 
The study employed a three condition (No Mediation, Formulative Mediation, 
Manipulative Mediation) between-subjects experimental design. Subjects were paired 
into same-gender intercultural dyads based on their availability. Within each dyad, 
participants were randomly assigned to player role (Player 1 or Player 2). Each dyad was 
randomly assigned to mediation condition. Seventeen dyads completed the simulation 
with a formulative mediator, 18 dyads completed the simulation with a manipulative 
mediator, and 18 dyads completed the simulation with no mediator. All materials were in 
English, and the dyads negotiated in English.  
The study was conducted in two parts. In Part I, participants completed an online 
survey (Part I Questionnaire) in which they read the disputing scenario (see Appendix A), 
responded to scales measuring cultural values and individual differences, including 
generalized trust, and completed a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix B).  
Participants completed Part II of the study in designated laboratory spaces on the 
two university campuses. Participants were given five minutes to review the disputing 
scenario at the beginning of Part II. Participants then completed a pre-negotiation 
questionnaire, which included items measuring contextualized trust, willingness to 
concede during the negotiation, and openness to mediation (see Appendix C).  
After completing the pre-negotiation questionnaire, participants reviewed a Power 
Point tutorial which explained how to use the virtual lab, which will be discussed further 




virtual lab on the computer. The participants were instructed by the experimenter to sit at 
the computer, put on their headsets, and begin their discussion with the other player. The 
participants were given 28 minutes to negotiate a solution to the disputing scenario. The 
negotiation period was divided into seven four-minute rounds. If both participants 
consented, the video conference was recorded; if one or both participants declined to be 
recorded, the experimenters did not record the video conference. Participants in four 
dyads declined to be recorded. The experimenter did not monitor the negotiation. When 
the participants had reached a solution or the 28-minute time limit expired, they 
completed a post-negotiation questionnaire (see Appendix D), which included a modified 
version of the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI, Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). The 
post-negotiation questionnaire also included manipulation check items about the 
mediator; only participants who indicated that a mediator intervened in their discussion 
answered questions about the mediator. The three manipulation check items measured 
perceptions of the mediator's actions during the negotiation; participants were asked to 
rate the extent to which the mediator suggested offers, pushed the players to accept 
proposals, and threatened to punish the players (1 = not at all, 5 = very much). At the end 
of the post-negotiation questionnaire, all participants completed a series of funnel 
debriefing questions designed to assess suspicion about the mediator and the study. These 
questions asked participants about their impressions of the study, the purpose of the 
study, whether anything stood out or seemed strange to them, or if they noticed anything 
unusual about their partner or the mediator. Any participants who indicated that they 
believed that the mediator was not a real person were excluded from the analyses. Fifty-
three of the 55 dyads (96.3%) did not indicate suspicion about the mediator; only two 




excluded from the analyses. The final sample consisted of 24 male and 29 female 
intercultural dyads. 
Materials: Disputing Case 
The scenario used in the study is a mixed-motive community disputing case 
between two tenants in a company-owned apartment building (see Appendix A). This 
new case was developed based on in-depth interviews conducted with participants in the 
Middle East and the United States. The case was developed in collaboration with 
researchers in the United States, Israel, and Turkey, and extensive pilot data and feedback 
was collected to ensure that the issues in the case were relevant across the cultures of 
interest. The case was also pretested with American intracultural, Turkish intracultural, 
and American-Turkish intercultural dyads to ensure that the allotted negotiation time was 
appropriate and that the case was sufficiently motivating.  
There were five issues under dispute in the case, and each issue was associated 
with five potential solutions. Each solution was assigned a point value. If the participants 
agreed on the same solution options for all five issues, they received the number of points 
associated with each solution option. The case was constructed so that two of the issues 
were distributive (Garbage and Noise), two of the issues were integrative (Basketball 
Court Use and Patio Use), and one issue represented compatible interests (Parking Lot 
Access). Thus, the case had integrative potential, in that if disputants shared information 
on their differing priorities and compatible interests, they could enhance their joint 
outcome. The case also included a Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement 
(BATNA); the case instructions stated that if the participants did not come to an 




each player would be automatically assigned a point value equal to that of the least Pareto 
efficient agreement possible (i.e., 280 points for each player). Five disputing dyads 
received the BATNA because they did not reach an agreement in the allotted time. 
The disputing case consisted of the basic scenario, which includes general 
information about the dispute, a description of the five issues, the potential solutions for 
each issue with the assigned point values, and a summary issue chart (see Appendix A). 
In addition to the basic scenario, additional passages were included in the case for the 
formulative and manipulative mediation conditions. In both mediated conditions, an 
additional passage in the directions described that the building manager, who is friends 
with the disputants’ supervisor at work, had stepped in to help the disputants come to an 
agreement. The passage explained that an expert mediator would play the role of the 
building manager in the dispute, and that the mediator would monitor the participants’ 
discussion and send messages with potential solutions to the participants. The passage 
stated that:  
Because the dispute has been impossible to resolve up to this point, a 
mediator has stepped in to help you and your partner come to a solution. It 
is very common for mediators to try to help people in difficult conflicts 
such as the one you will read about. In this study, a trained mediator with 
extensive experience will try to help you and your partner find the best 
solution. The mediator will watch as you and your partner exchange offers 
during the negotiation. When he thinks of an offer that might interest you 
and your partner, he will send it to you. Even if you and your partner think 
you may have come to an agreement, the mediator might send you another 
offer if he thinks that you could improve your agreement. The mediator 
will likely contact you every 3-4 minutes during your negotiation. Though 
the mediator is here to help you, you are under no obligation to accept his 
offers. The mediator cannot force you to accept a final agreement. 
 
In addition to the above passage, participants in the manipulative mediation condition 




description of the manipulative mediator, explaining that he had several means for 
pressing the disputing tenants to resolve their conflicts. The passage stated: 
The conflict with Alex has continued for several weeks. Since the two of 
you cannot seem to resolve your differences and your arguments have 
been negatively affecting other tenants at Oakland Apartments, the 
building manager, Jordan Smith, has stepped in to try to help solve the 
conflict. In the past, Jordan has tried to treat disputing tenants fairly while 
also trying to find an appropriate solution. However, he does have some 
power over the tenants because of his close relationship with the owners of 
the apartments, the Oakland Company. In the past he has had to use 
several methods to encourage disputing tenants to settle their arguments. 
The following options are available to Jordan as he tries to help you and 
Alex resolve your disagreements. If Jordan chooses to use any of these 
methods, which he can do at any time, points will be taken away from the 
points you or Alex earn during the negotiation. To show the cost of each 
of Jordan’s actions, we have created a points system.  
 
The passage then listed three potential punishments that the mediator could use or 
threaten to use during the dispute. The punishments as described in the story included 
both social and financial costs to the participants, and each punishment was assigned a 
point-value penalty that was taken out of participants’ final scores. If the mediator put a 
disputant on probation, the penalty was 60 points, if the mediator reported a dispute to the 
tenants’ workplace, the penalty was 90 points, and if the mediator advised the disputant's 
company to evict them, the penalty was 120 points. The disputing case was also altered 
to reflect the intercultural nature of the dispute and the gender of the dyad. The names 
used in the case reflected the player role assignments and culture of the participants; for 
example, in a dyad in which the American participant was assigned to the role of Player 1 
and the Turkish participant was assigned to the role of Player 2, the names “Alex” and 
“Deniz” were used as the disputant names in the case. The names used in the case (Alex, 
Tyler, Özgür, Deniz) are considered gender-neutral in their native language. The general 




(e.g., “Alex, a young man from the United States”); this description was altered to reflect 
the national origin of the participants (i.e., “from the United States”; “from Turkey”) in 
their player roles and the gender (“a young man”; “a young woman”) of the dyad.  
Apparatus: The Virtual Lab 
The study developed and utilized a “virtual lab,” which combined a video 
conference with a web-based negotiation interface. The study employed video 
conferencing to facilitate a realistic discussion of the dispute; the video conference 
allowed participants to both see and hear their partner in real time during the negotiation 
period. During the negotiation session, participants communicated using the ooVoo video 
conferencing software (www.oovoo.com). Computers at both universities were outfitted 
with identical webcams and headsets with microphones. The ooVoo video conference 
interface displays one window with the participant’s video feed, and another window 
with the participant’s partner’s video feed. The ooVoo software also allowed optional 
recording of the video conference. 
In addition to the video conference, participants interacted through a web-based 
negotiation interface (see Appendix E for a screen shot of the interface), which the 
participants used to send their formal offers to their partner. The interface was necessary 
to communicate real-time information about the participants’ negotiation to the mediator 
and to create a channel though which the agent mediator could send messages to the 
participants. The interface consisted of 5 drop-down menus, one for each of the issues in 
the disputing scenario. Each drop-down menu included the 5 solution options for the 
dispute issue and the point values associated with each solution option. To send a 




drop-down menus and press “send.” The participants were alerted to incoming proposals 
with a text message that appeared in the middle of the interface window. To respond to 
an offer, the participants had to select the offer by clicking on it in the history of actions 
portion of the interface, and then press “accept” or “reject.” The interface allowed 
participants to make partial offers (i.e., they did not have send proposals with solutions 
for all five offers). As participants came to agreement on the issues, the agreed-upon 
terms were displayed next to the drop-down menus.  
When the participants reached an agreement on all five issues, they had to enter 
the terms of their agreement using pre-programmed drop-down menus and submit it to 
the program. If the terms from both players were identical, the negotiation ended and the 
interface automatically logged the participants off of the system. If the final agreement 
terms entered by the players were not identical, the interface sent the participants a 
message indicating that the terms did not match and they were returned to the negotiation 
interface to resolve the disagreement. The agreements made through the interface were 
not binding until a final agreement was submitted; the participants were free to 
renegotiate the terms of their agreement at any time regardless of whether a previous 
proposal had been accepted. The participants were also able to end the negotiation at any 
time by clicking the “Opt-Out” button on the interface. None of the dyads in the current 
study opted out of the negotiation. The interface was also programmed to send reminder 
messages to the participants. If the participants went one four-minute round without 
sending or responding to offers through the interface, the interface displayed a message 
reminding the participants to use the interface to send their offers. The interface also sent 
a message at the beginning of the final four-minute round indicating that the participants 




and responses made during the negotiation, the final offer if one was reached, and the 
number of round taken to reach resolution. 
Apparatus: Agent Mediator 
The mediator was played by a computer agent programmed to mediate using 
either a formulative or manipulative mediation style. The agent proposed solutions and 
sent messages to the participants through the negotiation interface. All mediator messages 
were sent as text messages that appeared in the center of the negotiation interface 
window, and participants had to manually close each mediator message in order to 
continue using the interface. In both mediated conditions, the mediator sent an 
introductory message to the participants. In the formulative mediation condition, the 
introduction stated that the mediator would be taking the role of the building manager in 
the dispute, and that he would monitor the discussion and send messages or proposals if 
he thought he could help the players come to a solution (see Appendix F for mediator 
introductions). In the manipulative mediation condition, the introductory message also 
stated that the mediator had methods of pushing the players to come to an agreement, 
summarized the potential punishments the mediator could use, and stated that if he used 
any of these methods, points would be taken off of the player’s final scores.  
Throughout the negotiation, both the formulative and the manipulative mediator 
sent proposals to the participants. The agent mediator in both conditions was 
programmed to maximize the social welfare of the participants’ agreement. The agent 
was programmed with information about how the players ranked each issue in terms of 
importance, which was based on the point value of the issue, but the agent did not have 




through the negotiation interface, and waited for the players to exchange proposals. 
Based on the player proposals, the agent identified the issue or issues relevant to the 
players’ current discussion. The agent then used the player proposals to calculate a set of 
potential solutions to propose, which were ordered based on the joint rankings and 
consequent social welfare. The agent discarded any solutions with lower social welfare 
ranking than the last offer, or any solutions that were non-Pareto-optimal. Once it 
determined an acceptable solution, the agent sent the proposed solution to the participants 
with a pre-defined set of messages to persuade the players to accept the solution (see 
Appendix F for an example proposal message). The agent sent proposed solutions to the 
players throughout the negotiation session, and each proposal message was sent to both 
players simultaneously. 
The manipulative mediator was also programmed to send pre-defined threat and 
punishment messages to the players (see Appendix F for example threat and punishment 
messages). The threat messages warned the target participant that the mediator was 
considering enacting a punishment against him or her, and the punishment messages 
enacted these threats by taking points away from the participant. These messages were 
triggered by several negotiator behaviors: failing to make offers, making bad offers (i.e., 
offers that were highly unfavorable to the other player), and rejecting good offers (i.e., 
offers that were favorable to both players). If a participant engaged in any of these 
behaviors, the mediator first sent him or her a threat message indicating why the player 
was being threatened and that the mediator would take away points if the player did not 
change his or her behavior. If the player corrected his or her bad behavior, the mediator 
sent a message indicating that the threat had been cleared and that the player was no 




mediator sent a punishment message that included the number of points to be taken from 
his or her final score. The mediator in the study was based on AutoMed (Chalamish & 
Kraus, 2007), an automated mediator shown to produce better settlement rates, faster 
settlements, and more negotiator satisfaction than unmediated negotiations; the AutoMed 
mediator was then adapted to program the manipulative mediator used in the current 
study.  
Pilot Tests: Disputing Case, Virtual Laboratory, and Agent Mediator 
Due to the importance of creating a negotiating task and experimental context that 
would be equivalent in both cultures, the disputing case, virtual lab, and agent mediator 
were calibrated using pilot studies. The disputing case was developed based on in-depth 
interviews conducted with participants in the Middle East and the United States. The case 
was developed in collaboration with researchers in the United States, Israel, and Turkey 
to ensure that the issues in the case were relevant in the US and Turkey and that the case 
was sufficiently motivating for the participants.  
The design of the virtual lab and the agent mediator were also piloted extensively 
to ensure that the interface was easy to use and that the mediator was believable. The 
interface design was adjusted based on participant feedback collected in the United States 
and Turkey, as well as samples from Israel collected by our collaborators. Further, our 
team created several different means of communicating the agent mediator's messages to 
the participants, including text messages, text messages plus a text-based mediator 
introduction and mediator avatar, and an animated mediator avatar with both text and 




mediator introduction and avatar delivery maximized the social presence of the mediator 
while minimizing suspicion about the mediator. 
Measures 
Dispute Difficulty Markers 
Contextualized trust is defined as the negotiator’s trust in his or her partner in the 
negotiation. Contextualized trust was operationalized using a one-item measure (“I feel 
that I can depend on my partner to have my best interests at heart during this 
negotiation,” with 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) in the pre-negotiation 
questionnaire. Openness to mediation was operationalized using a one-item measure (“I 
want the mediator to get involved in this dispute,” with 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) in the pre-negotiation questionnaire. Willingness to concede was 
operationalized using a semantic differential item about the negotiator’s planned behavior 
for the negotiation session (“I plan to be…during the negotiation” 1 = unwilling to make 
concessions, 7 = willing to make concessions) measured in the pre-negotiation 
questionnaire. 
Generalized trust was measured with Yamagishi & Yamagishi’s (1994) six-item 
trust scale in the Part I online survey. An example of the items included in this scale is 
“Most people are basically honest,” and the scale is measured on a seven point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .85 
(Turkish sample α = .82; American sample α = .88), and a composite score was 
calculated for each participant by averaging the six items of the scale.  
Cultural intelligence was measured using Ang et al.’s (2007) cultural intelligence 




know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures”), motivational (e.g., “I 
am confident that I can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me”), 
behavioral (e.g., “I change my verbal behavior when a cross-cultural interaction requires 
it), and metacognitive (e.g., “I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when 
interacting with people from different cultural backgrounds.”). All the items are 
measured on a seven point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
Procrustes Factor Analysis (PFA) was used to assess the factor structure and 
structural equivalence (i.e., the similarity in factor structures) of the CQ scale across the 
American and Turkish samples. In general, Procrustes analysis performs a shape-
preserving Euclidean transformation to a set of factor matrices (Barrett, 2006). The 
Orthosim-2 program (Barrett, 2006) computes Procrustes analyses for factor loading 
matrices produced by exploratory factor analysis. In short, Orthosim rotates a comparison 
matrix against a target matrix to assess the similarity between the matrices. When using 
the Procrustes approach, the program stretches or shrinks the target and comparison 
matrices so they occupy the same unit-metric space (Barrett, 2006). The program 
produces the mean solution cosine, or overall solution congruence for the entire factor 
structure. Recommendations for acceptable levels of overall solution congruence 
generally range from .85 (e.g., Mulaik, 1972) to .90 (Barrett, 1986; Van de Vijer & 
Leung, 1997). The program also produces the congruence coefficients calculated for each 
row (variable) in the target and maximally congruent target matrix. Barrett (1986) 
suggested that congruence coefficients equal or greater than .80 indicate useful 
conceptual similarity.  
To conduct the PFA using Orthosim, separate exploratory factor analyses were 




maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation. The two rotated factor matrices 
were submitted to the Orthosim program, with the American factor matrix specified as 
the target matrix and the Turkish factor matrix specified as the comparison matrix (i.e., 
the Turkish matrix was rotated against the American matrix). The two factor matrices 
showed an acceptable level of congruence, with the overall solution congruence equaling 
.92. All congruence coefficients for the variables exceeded the .80 cutoff except for one 
coefficient which equaled .77. At this point, the full combined sample was used to 
conduct an exploratory factor analysis on all of the items using maximum likelihood 
extraction and varimax rotation. The factor analysis produced a four factor solution. The 
rotated factor matrix was examined, and three items with loadings below .40 or that 
displayed cross-loading, as indicated by factor loading values with less than a .20 
difference on multiple factors, were removed from the analysis. The final factor structure 
indicated four factors with all factor loadings above .40 (see Table 1). 
The first factor that emerged included the six items from the cognitive subscale. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the subscale was .88 (Turkish sample α = .80; American 
sample α = .92). The second factor that emerged included the four items from the 
metacognitive subscale and one item from the behavioral subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha 
for the second subscale was .86 (Turkish sample α = .82; American sample α = .89). The 
third factor that emerged included four of the five items from the motivational subscale, 
and the Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale was .83 (Turkish sample α = .75; American 
sample α = .88). The final factor that emerged included two of the items from the 
behavioral subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha for the fourth subscale was .75 (Turkish 





Joint outcome was assessed using the Pareto efficiency of the final agreement. 
The Pareto efficiency of the agreement is a dyadic level measure of the joint efficiency of 
the agreement. Because of the integrative potential in the disputing scenario, it was 
possible for participants to logroll, or trade-off on low priority issues to gain value in 
higher priority issues (Froman & Cohen, 1970). The more participants logroll, the more 
efficient the agreement. The most efficient agreement, or the one for which there are no 
additional agreements that could improve the outcome of one party without hurting the 
other party, is called the Pareto efficient agreement (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & 
Musswiler, 2005; Thompson, 1990, 2001; Tripp & Sondak, 1992). To calculate the 
efficiency of an agreement, it is necessary to first calculate the number of solutions that 
would be better for both negotiators (“better”) and the number of solutions that would be 
worse for both negotiators (“worse”). Pareto efficiency is calculated as such: 
  (1)            
The current study used the Okhuysen and Pounds, version 1.23 (2005) 
spreadsheet to calculate the Pareto efficiency of the agreements. To use the spreadsheet, 
each of the solution levels of the five issues in the disputing case and the point values of 
the solutions for each player were entered. The agreements for all dyads were also 
entered, and the spreadsheet uses algorithms based on Tripp & Sondak (1992) to 
calculate the Pareto efficiency of each agreement. 
The current study utilized a modified version of the Subjective Value Inventory 
(SVI, Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006) to assess subjective satisfaction with the 




negotiation, and the original scale included 16 items to assess four components of 
subjective value: feelings about the instrumental outcome, feelings about the self, 
feelings about the process, and feelings about the relationship. These subscales can be 
averaged to create a global subjective value score. In the current study, 15 items based off 
of the original SVI were used to create a base subjective value scale; one of the original 
items (“Did you behave according to your own principles and values”) was deleted due to 
reports that participants had difficulty responding to the item in the study pilots. 
Additional items were added to assess the impact of the negotiations on the participants 
honor and reputation (“did this game positively or negatively impact your honor,” and 
“did this game positively or negative impact your reputation”) and perceptions of 
cooperation (“how cooperative do you think you were during the game”). See Appendix 
D for the full subjective value scale used in the current study.  
Procrustes Factor Analysis (PFA) was used to assess the factor structure and 
structural equivalence of the subjective value scale across the American and Turkish 
samples. To conduct the PFA, separate exploratory factor analyses on the subjective 
value scale were conducted for the American and Turkish samples using maximum 
likelihood extraction and varimax rotation. The two rotated factor matrices were 
submitted to the Orthosim-2 program, with the American factor matrix specified as the 
target matrix and the Turkish factor matrix specified as the comparison matrix (i.e., the 
Turkish matrix was rotated against the American matrix). An iterative process of 
assessing the overall solution congruence and congruence coefficients for acceptable 
levels of similarity was used. Because the initial overall solution congruence and several 




deleted and the exploratory factor analyses for the two samples were run re-run and 
resubmitted to the Orthosim program.  
After three iterations and deleting 4 items from the scale, the two factor matrices 
reached an overall solution congruence of .91, and all of the congruence coefficients 
exceeded .80 except for one coefficient which equaled .70. At this point, the full 
combined sample was used to conduct an exploratory factor analysis on the remaining 
variables using maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation. The factor analysis 
produced a four factor solution. The rotated factor matrices were examined, and any 
items with loadings below .40 or that displayed cross-loading across factors were 
removed from the analysis. The final factor structure indicated four factors with all factor 
loadings above .40 (see Table 2). 
The first factor included three of the original SVI items measuring feelings about 
the instrumental outcomes, as well as one item measuring feelings about the negotiation 
process (“how satisfied are you with the ease of reaching an agreement”). This subscale 
is labeled “satisfaction with outcome.” It is relevant to note that a clear factor reflecting 
the original SVI subscale of feelings about process did not emerge in the present sample. 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the satisfaction with outcome subscale was .88 (Turkish sample 
α = .91; American sample α = .88).  
The second factor included two of the original SVI items measuring feelings 
about the self, as well as the added measure of impact on reputation. This subscale is 
labeled “feelings about self” and the Cronbach’s alpha for this subscale is .79 (Turkish 
sample α = .80; American sample α = .80). The third factor included two of the original 
SVI items measuring feelings about process and one of the original SVI items measuring 




relationship between the negotiators, this subscale is labeled “rapport” (Curhan, 
Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .86 (Turkish sample α = 
.83; American sample α = .87). Finally, the fourth factor included two items, one of the 
original SVI instrumental items assessing the fairness of the outcome and the added item 
regarding cooperativeness during the negotiation. Because this factor was not 
theoretically meaningful and the Cronbach’s alpha for the subscale fell below an 
acceptable level (α = .66), this factor will not be discussed in the remainder of the paper. 
As with the original SVI, a global subjective value score, labeled “overall satisfaction,” 
was computed by averaging the first three subscales. The Cronbach's alpha for the overall 




Chapter 3: Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
As stated, the objective outcome of Pareto efficiency is a dyadic level measure. I 
also aggregated the subjective measures to the dyad level, and justified aggregation using 
recommended standards. The intraclass correlation coefficients, ICC(1) and ICC(2), were 
used to assess whether aggregation was appropriate (Bleise, 2000). The ICC(1) statistic, 
which is a ratio of between-group variance to total variance, has been interpreted as the 
proportion of total variance attributable to group membership (Bryk & Raudenbush, 
1982) and as an index of interrater reliability (James, 1982). The current analyses 
calculated ICC(1) values using a one-way random-effects ANOVA model and the Bartko 
(1976) formula. ICC(2) values, which estimate the reliability of the group means (Bliese, 
2000), were also calculated. The intraclass correlations for the outcomes and difficulty 
markers are listed in Table 3. The ICC(1) values for satisfaction with outcome, rapport, 
and overall satisfaction were greater than .3, and the ICC(2) values were greater than .5, 
warranting aggregation to the dyad level. The intraclass correlation for the feelings about 
self subscale did not meet the standards for aggregation and so was not analyzed at the 
dyad level.  
The difficulty measures were also aggregated to the dyad level. These follow an 
additive composition model (Chan, 1998); the aggregated construct is simply an average 
of the individual units without consideration of the variance at the individual level. 
Because the difficulty measures were assessed before any interaction occurred between 
the participants in each dyad, there is no reason to expect within-dyad consensus on these 




participants within the dyads. For all questionnaire items and scales, the mean was 
calculated for the dyad. Means, standard deviations, and the bivariate correlations 
between all the measures are listed in Table 4. 
Suspicion and Manipulation Checks 
The study included a number of manipulation checks. In addition, at the end of 
the post-negotiation questionnaire, all participants completed funnel debriefing questions 
designed to assess suspicion about the mediator and the study. Any participants who 
indicated that they believed that the mediator was not a real person were excluded from 
the analyses. Fifty-three of the 55 dyads (96.3%) did not indicate suspicion about the 
mediator; only two participants were suspicious of the mediator and the data from these 
two dyads were excluded from the analyses. The final sample consisted of 24 male and 
29 female intercultural dyads. 
Of the 35 dyads in the mediated conditions, 32 correctly responded that a 
mediator had intervened in their dispute; the remaining three came to a solution before 
the mediator could intervene.
1
 Analyses of the three manipulation check items included 
in the post-negotiation questionnaire indicated that the two mediated conditions differed 
only on the last item; dyads in the manipulative mediation condition (M = 2.08, SD = 
1.48) reported that the mediator threatened them more than dyads in the formulative 
mediation condition (M = 1.07, SD = .18, t(30) = 2.65, p < .05).  
In addition, a review of the mediator's behavior during the negotiations indicated 
that the number of mediator offers sent to the dyads ranged from zero to 14, with a mean 
of 6.23 offers and a standard deviation of 4.54 offers. An analysis of the mediator 




proposals the mediator sent to the dyads in the two conditions (t(33) = .14, p = .89). The 
manipulative mediator sent a total of 10 threat messages to 8 of the 18 dyads in the 
manipulative mediation condition, and only enacted punishment in one dyad. 
Primary Analyses 
A series of hierarchical regressions were used to assess the interaction between 
manipulation condition and dispute difficulty. For each difficulty marker, separate three-
step hierarchical regressions were conducted for the Pareto efficiency and subjective 
value outcomes. In the first step, gender was entered as a covariate; previous meta-
analyses have uncovered significant gender differences in negotiation outcomes 
(Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). In addition, exploratory analyses indicated that there 
were significant gender differences in the Pareto efficiency outcome, with male dyads (M 
= 863.38, SD = 277.12) achieving more efficient solutions than female dyads (M = 
670.26, SD = 366.41, t(51) = 2.25, p < .05).  In the second step, the terms for mediation 
condition and the focal difficulty marker were entered. Two effects-coded variables were 
used for mediation condition. The first variable was the effects coded variable for 
formulative mediation, and was coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative,   0 = 
manipulative. The second variable was the effects coded variable for manipulative 
mediation, and was coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = formulative mediation, 1 = 
manipulative mediation. Effects coding was used to facilitate the interpretation of the 
regression coefficients; the regression coefficients for the first and second effects coded 
variables for mediation condition provide a test of whether formulative and manipulative 
mediation, respectively, outperformed the average of the three mediation conditions. In 




the focal difficulty marker; the interaction terms were created by multiplying the 
difficulty marker with each of the effect coded mediation terms.  
Contextualized Trust 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that there would be a significant interaction between 
manipulative mediation and contextualized trust. The results supported Hypothesis 1a. 
For the Pareto efficiency outcome, the interaction between the variable for manipulative 
mediation and contextualized trust was significant in the full model (B = -156.79, p < .01; 
see Table 5). Consistent with Hypothesis 1a, dyads with lower contextualized trust 
achieved more efficient solutions than dyads with higher contextualized trust in the 
manipulative condition (see Figure 1).  The results for overall satisfaction also confirmed 
Hypothesis 1a (see Table 6). There was a significant interaction between the variable for 
manipulative mediation and contextualized trust (B = -.31, p < .05); in the manipulative 
mediation condition, dyads with lower contextualized trust reported higher overall 
satisfaction than dyads with higher contextualized trust (see Figure 2). 
Willingness to Concede 
 
The results also supported Hypothesis 1b, which stated there would be a 
significant interaction between manipulative mediation and willingness to concede. For 
the Pareto efficiency outcome, the interaction between the variable for manipulative 
mediation and willingness to concede was marginally significant in the full model (B = -
168.53, p < .10; see Table 7). Consistent with Hypothesis 1b, dyads who were unwilling to 
concede achieved more efficient solutions than dyads who reported being more willing to 
concede in the manipulative condition (see Figure 3). The results for overall satisfaction 




interaction between the variable for manipulative mediation and willingness to concede 
(B = -.44, p < .05). In the manipulative mediation condition, dyads that were unwilling to 
concede reported higher overall satisfaction than dyads who reported more willingness to 
concede (see Figure 4). 
Openness to Mediation  
 
Hypothesis 1c predicted that there would be a significant interaction between 
manipulative mediation and openness to mediation. The results supported Hypothesis 1c. 
For the Pareto efficiency outcome, the interaction between the variable for manipulative 
mediation and openness to mediation was significant in the full model (B = -143.99, p < 
.05; see Table 9). Consistent with Hypothesis 1c, dyads who reported low openness to 
mediation reached more efficient solutions than dyads who reported being more open in 
the manipulative condition (see Figure 5). The results for overall satisfaction did not 
support Hypothesis 1c. Further analyses indicated that the results for satisfaction with 
outcome subscale did support the hypothesis. In the full model, there was a significant 
interaction between the variable for manipulative mediation and openness to mediation 
(B = -.42, p < .05; see Table 10). In the manipulative mediation condition, dyads who 
reported low openness to mediation reported higher satisfaction with the outcome than 
dyads who reported being more open to mediation (see Figure 6). 
Generalized Trust 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be an interaction between manipulative 
mediation and generalized trust. The results partially supported Hypothesis 2. For the 
Pareto efficiency outcome, the interaction between the variable for manipulative 




see Table 11). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, dyads who reported low generalized trust 
reached more efficient solutions than dyads who reported higher generalized trust (see 
Figure 7). The results for overall satisfaction and the subjective value subscales did not 
support Hypothesis 2. 
Cultural Intelligence 
As discussed, intercultural disputes pose a unique set of challenges, which may be 
partly ameliorated when disputants possess higher cultural intelligence scores. To explore 
this possibility, another series of hierarchical regressions identical to the previously 
presented analyses were conducted by replacing the difficulty markers with the cultural 
intelligence subscales and global measure. Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a 
significant interaction between manipulative mediation and cultural intelligence. The 
results suggested trending support for Hypothesis 3 with regards to motivational CQ. 
Though the statistics for R
2
-change, the overall ANOVA, and the regression coefficients 
did not reach significance, the results for the motivational component of cultural 
intelligence showed a similar trend to the previously reported results for the Pareto 
efficiency outcome (see Table 12). The interaction between the effects coded variable for 
manipulative mediation and motivational CQ was negative (B = -128.43, p = .18). These 
results suggest a trend in which dyads who with low motivational CQ reached more 
efficient agreements than dyads with higher motivational CQ (see Figure 8). None of the 
other CQ measures interacted with the effects coded variables for mediation condition. 
This result suggests that low cultural intelligence may possibly operate as an additional 




findings merely replicate the trend uncovered for the difficulty markers, as the statistics 





Chapter 4: Discussion 
The current study is the first to examine which mediation styles are most effective 
in managing intercultural disputes in an experimental setting. In an era of increasing 
global interdependence, intercultural disputes occur in a wide range of contexts, from 
international to organizational to interpersonal. Yet there is very little research that has 
explored which factors affect the resolution of intercultural disputes, and no experimental 
work on mediation styles in intercultural conflicts. Moreover, the mainstream mediation 
literature has yet to examine the cultural context of disputes. Accordingly, this study 
begins to fill an important void in the literature. 
I designed a study in which intercultural dyads, composed of college students in 
the United States and Turkey, were randomly assigned to negotiate an agreement to a 
community dispute under formulative mediation, manipulative mediation, or no 
mediation. The results supported the contingency approach to mediation. As 
hypothesized, in the manipulative mediation condition, dyads in more difficult disputes 
achieved better outcomes than dyads in less difficult disputes. The results provided 
support for the hypotheses regarding previously used difficulty markers (contextualized 
trust, willingness to concede, and openness to mediation), and suggest that generalized 
trust may be an additional factor moderating the effectiveness of mediation styles. 
Finally, though the results did not reach standard tests for significance, the general trend 
suggests that cultural intelligence may be another factor that moderates the effectiveness 




Contributions to Theory and Research 
As discussed, the current study offers additional support for the contingency 
theory of mediation, finding that the effectiveness of mediation styles varies depending 
on aspects of the disputing context. Specifically, the current study supports previous 
theory and research on the interaction between difficult conditions and pressing or 
manipulative styles to predict effectiveness. In addition to the general support of 
contingency theory, the current study also supported the theory in intercultural contexts; 
the current study is the first known study to test the theory on the contingent effectiveness 
of mediation tactics in intercultural disputes. The current study not only shows that the 
contingent view of mediation may be applicable in both intracultural and intercultural 
disputes, but also suggests that the cultural context of the dispute may be an important 
factor that also acts as a contingency affecting mediation style effectiveness.  
The current study tested traditional markers of dispute difficulty like 
contextualized trust, intransigence, and resistance to mediation, but also proposed and 
tested difficulty markers that were not included in previous theory. The inclusion of 
generalized trust as a difficulty marker indicates that more general individual differences 
can impact the effectiveness of mediation styles. Further, though the results did not reach 
significance, the trends uncovered for motivational CQ support previous findings that 
cultural intelligence may mitigate some of the difficulties in intercultural disputes (Imai 
& Gelfand, 2010), and thus suggest that CQ may also act as a moderator of mediation 
style effectiveness.  
The current study is also among the first to test the contingency theory using 




difficulty markers. As discussed, previous tests of the contingent effectiveness of 
mediation styles have generally relied on mediator reports of dispute characteristics and 
mediation style. Dyads in the current study were randomly assigned to mediation 
condition, and the styles in the two mediated conditions were standardized using agent 
mediators. By manipulating rather than measuring mediation style, the experimental 
design of the current study strengthens the confidence in the results. Further, the 
standardization of mediation style ensured that there were no systematic differences in 
the content or delivery of the mediator intervention across dyads. In addition, the 
collection of the difficulty and subjective value outcome data from the disputants rather 
than from the mediator avoids potential biases in the measurement of these variables and 
supports the contingency theory of mediation style effectiveness using disputant reports. 
Finally, the current study design includes an unmediated condition, providing an 
appropriate control condition against which to compare the impact of different mediation 
styles on dispute outcomes.  
The current study also offers several contributions to general research on 
intercultural disputes and conflict resolution. The study is one of the first to create and 
implement a “virtual lab” for the study of intercultural negotiation. This technology 
allowed participants to negotiate in real-time with both audio and visual contact while 
staying in their home countries. The negotiation interface simultaneously allowed for the 
recording of disputants’ offer behavior and the monitoring of the negotiation by the agent 
mediator. The virtual lab thus facilitated a realistic conversation between members of 
different cultures while also providing objective data on their negotiations. This 
technology may help free researchers interested in intercultural interactions from relying 




low cost communication medium through which participants in different cultures can 
communicate. Further, the study provided additional support for the use of agent 
mediators in studies of negotiation and disputing. The study also facilitated the 
development of a new community-based mediation case that is appropriate to use in 
studies of intercultural disputes.  
Contributions to Practice 
The current study has several implications for mediators. Generally, it supports 
the contingency approach in encouraging mediators to consider the disputing context 
when determining whether to intervene in a dispute and how to select intervention tactics. 
Specifically, the current study suggests that when disputes are very difficult, as defined 
by low contextualized or generalized trust, resistance to mediation, or disputants who are 
unwilling to concede, mediators will likely facilitate the best outcomes by using 
manipulative tactics. However, such tactics may actually inhibit the achievement of high 
objective and subjective outcomes when the dispute characteristics are more favorable. 
Further, the study suggests that mediators should assess the cultural context of the dispute 
when determining whether and how to intervene in a dispute. The current study focused 
on the intercultural context, and suggests that mediators should be aware of the unique 
difficulties of intercultural disputes when selecting tactics. The tentative results suggest 
that intercultural disputes may be particularly difficult when disputants have low cultural 
intelligence, and that these disputes may be amenable to forceful or pressing mediator 
tactics. Combined with previous theory and research on the impact of culture on 
disputing and mediation, the current study highlights the need for mediators to account 




current study also provides an interesting paradox for real-world mediators; though 
disputants from very different cultures may be the least open to mediation (Inman, Kishi, 
& Wilkenfeld, in preparation), when a mediator does intervene, it may be the most 
pressing and forceful tactics that produce the highest outcomes to the disputants.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study is limited by its use of a hypothetical disputing case and its 
reliance on student samples from only two cultures. First, though the use of hypothetical 
disputing cases is common in negotiation research, the ensuing disputes are necessarily 
somewhat artificial. However, the case used in the current study was pretested to ensure 
that it was engaging, realistic, and produced intense disputes in student samples. Real-
world disputes are likely to be even more intense, suggesting that the present results will 
likely generalize to actual disputes. Second, the sample in the current data collection 
relies on young, educated student samples from democratic nations, which may impact 
the generalizability of the findings. These students may not have real world experience 
dealing with conflict or may exhibit unique conflict resolution tactics as compared to 
adult community members in their cultures. However, given that the disputing scenario 
was designed and piloted to be realistic to the student participants, who have likely 
experienced conflict within their living arrangements, this limitation should not impact 
the validity of the general findings. Nevertheless, future research is necessary to explore 
how mediation styles function in inter- and intracultural disputes between negotiators 
from different cultures and demographic backgrounds (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2011). In addition, future research could experimentally examine how cultural 




suggested that manipulative mediation may be more effective in disputes with negotiators 
from very difficult cultures (Inman, Kishi, & Wilkenfeld, in preparation).  
The current study is also limited by the lack of intracultural comparison groups. 
As such, any comments or conclusions regarding the impact of intercultural disputes on 
mediation style effectiveness are at best tentative; without a comparison to American and 
Turkish intracultural disputes, there are limited grounds to claim that the intercultural 
disputes studied here were more difficult than intracultural disputes or that cultural 
context posed as an additional difficulty factor impacting the effectiveness of mediation 
tactics. To address this weakness, our research team is currently collecting data from 
American and Turkish intracultural dyads using methods identical to those presented 
here. Upon completion of data collection, all analyses will be re-run using the full 
sample. In addition, a new set of analyses will compare the impact of intercultural versus 
intracultural disputing contexts to measure whether the intercultural disputes are more 
difficult than the intracultural disputes, and whether the increased difficulty of 
intercultural disputes impacts mediation style effectiveness.  
An additional limitation of the study arises from the trade-off between the internal 
and external validity of the mediation style manipulation. While the current study 
attempted to use standardized “pure” forms of mediation by programming the agent to 
exhibit only formulative or manipulative mediation, this behavior is probably not 
reflective of how mediators mediate in real life. Real mediators adjust their styles to both 
the dispute context (Lim and Carnevale, 1991), as well as to the temporal stage of the 
negotiation (Pruitt, 2006). Further, the context of the dispute may also change as the 
negotiations progress; for example, negotiators may become more or less trusting of each 




contingency theory that real mediators likely monitor the characteristics of the dispute 
and change their mediation style contingently throughout the negotiation. Future research 
may explore the temporal aspect of mediation style selection and effectiveness, 
particularly in intercultural disputes, which may follow a different temporal trajectory 
from intracultural disputes.  
There are additional questions raised by the programming of the manipulative 
mediator. For example, the current study does not address whether the effects of the 
manipulator were caused by the potential to threaten and punish the disputants or by the 
actual punishments. As mentioned, the mediator only sent threat messages to 8 of the 18 
dyads in the manipulative condition, and only punished in one dyad. However, all dyads 
in the manipulative mediation condition were informed that the mediator could threaten 
and punish them. Future studies could explore whether mediators actually need to punish 
disputants to achieve better outcomes, or whether it is enough that the disputants know 
that the mediator has the potential or power to punish them. In addition, the manipulator 
in the current study was only programmed to administer threats and punishments. This 
decision was motivated by the inability to create realistic “carrots” or rewards in the 
community-based disputing case. However, as such, the current study does not explore 
the full range of manipulative or pressing mediator behavior, and future studies can 
explore the impact of mediator carrots on dispute outcomes under conditions of differing 
dispute difficulty. 
Another limitation of the current study is the exclusion of the facilitative 
mediation style, or one in which the mediator acts to facilitate and improve 
communication between the disputants. This mediation style was excluded due to the 




inability to program the agent mediator to implement facilitative behaviors; as a channel 
of communication, the facilitative mediator must be able to monitor and respond to the 
conversational exchanges between disputants, a task that current computer agents are not 
able to achieve in a realistic way. Future directions could explore the impact of 
facilitative mediation on inter- and intracultural disputes using trained human mediators. 
In particular, it would be informative to compare whether facilitative mediators can 
improve outcomes in low difficulty disputes. The current results showed that dyads in the 
least difficult disputes often performed best without a mediator, but perhaps the facilitator 
could improve these dyads’ outcomes by enhancing the their communication and 
information exchange.   
Conclusion 
Globalization has increased contact between members of different cultures in 
political, military, social, organizational, and community contexts. The development of 
culturally-sensitive means of conflict resolution are thus of great importance, and the 
current study begins to contribute to this goal by exploring the role of mediation and 
mediation styles in intercultural disputes. As suggested by the current study, cultural 
differences are one of many difficulties that can impede successful conflict resolution, 
but there are also effective methods of third party intervention that may help to 
ameliorate these problems. This study extends previous research on contingencies in 
mediation style by including the cultural context and individual differences as potentially 
important factors affecting style effectiveness, and provides critical information for 















The data were analyzed with and without the three dyads that were in a 
mediated condition but did receive messages from the mediator; the results did not 
change when the three dyads were excluded from the sample, and the analyses presented 














 Factor 2: 
Metacognitive 
 Factor 3: 
Motivational 
 Factor 4: 
Behavioral 
I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures. .66  .14  .21  .05 
I know the rules (e.g. vocabulary, grammar) of other languages. .78  -.01  .21  .07 
I know the cultural values and religious beliefs of other cultures. .77  .248  .15  .09 
I know the marriage systems of other cultures. .66  .173  .18  .09 
I know the arts and crafts of other cultures. .71  .12  .22  .31 
I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures. .69  .19  .05  .17 
I change my non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation 
requires it. 
.16  .53  .08  .24 
I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with 
people from different cultural backgrounds. 
.08  .86  .16  -.08 
I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture 
than is unfamiliar to me. 
.11  .80  .13  .224 
I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural 
interactions. 
.14  .82  .23  .17 
I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people 
from different cultures. 
.26  .56  .10  .08 
I am confident that I can socialize with locals in a culture that is 
unfamiliar to me. 
.18  .12  .68  .16 
I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is 
new to me. 
.12  .13  .84  .05 
I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me. .33  .11  .70  .08 
I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in 
a different culture. 
.19  .24  .58  .21 
I change my verbal behavior (e.g. accent, tone) when a cross-cultural 
interaction requires it. 
.19  .20  .21  .86 
I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural 
situations. 











with Outcome  
Factor 2: 
Feelings 
about Self  
Factor 3: 
Rapport  Factor 4 
How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., the extent to which 
the terms of your exchanges (or lack of exchanges) benefit you? 
.86  .12  .26  .15 
How satisfied are you with the balance between your own outcome and 
the other participant’s outcome? 
.76  .10  .12  .36 
How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of reaching an 
agreement? 
.69  .21  .30  .25 
Did you feel like you forfeited or “lost” in this game? .67  .08  .33  .01 
Did this game positively or negatively impact how competent you feel as 
a negotiator? 
.22  .75  .16  .02 
How did this game positively or negatively impact your self-image or 
your impression of yourself? 
.05  .97  .12  -.01 
How did this game positively or negatively impact your reputation? .07  .51  .15  .20 
Do you think the other participant understood your concerns? .32  .20  .74  .20 
Did the other participant consider your wishes, opinions, or needs? .40  .21  .77  .21 
Did the game make you trust the other participant? .26  .28  .56  .31 
Do you think the terms of your exchanges would be considered fair by an 
objective third party? 
.24  .18  .20  .54 







Aggregation Statistics  
  
 F  ICC(1)  ICC(2) 
Outcomes      
Satisfaction with    
Outcome 
 4.05**    .60     .75 
Feelings about Self    .83   -.09    -.21 
Rapport  2.25**    .38     .56 
Overall Satisfaction  2.11**    .36     .53 
      
Difficulty Markers      
Contextualized Trust    .84   -.09    -.20 
Willingness to Concede    .58   -.27    -.73 
Openness to Mediation    .88   -.07    -.14 
Generalized Trust    .93   -.03    -.07 
Metacognitive CQ    .62   -.23    -.62 
Cognitive CQ    .73   -.15    -.37 
Motivational CQ    .55   -.29    -.81 
Behavioral CQ    .90   -.05    -.11 
Overall CQ    .61   -.24    -.64 






Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables 
 
Note: N = 53 dyads for all variables.  
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Contextualized 
Trust 
3.77 1.09 -             
2. Willingness to 
Concede 
4.51 .80 .07 -            
3. Op nness to 
Mediation 
4.23 1.02 .07 .02 -           
4. Generalized Trust 4.46 .80 .15 .17 -.14 -          
5. Cognitive CQ 4.28 .74 -.01 -.21 -.04 -.09 -         
6. Metacogntivie CQ 5.26 .62 -.06 .09 .03 -.26 .34
*
 -        






 -       




 -      








 -     
10. Pareto Efficiency 757.72 322.99 -.17 -.16 -.12 -.07 .15 .24 .13 .04 .18 -    
11. Satisfaction with 
Outcome 
5.46 1.05 -.12 -.04 -.11 .05 .07 .04 .13 .19 .16 .60
**
 -   
12. Feelings about 
Self 
4.65 .67 .24 .02 .07 .16 .08 -.21 .16 -.09 -.03 .20 .33
*
 -  





















Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Pareto Efficiency of Agreements from Mediation Condition and Contextualized 
Trust 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender   96.56* 42.92 .30    89.25* 43.74 .28  125.58** 42.94 .39 
Contexualized Trust (CT)     -36.23 40.47 -.12  -15.77 38.96 -.05 
Formulative Med. (FM)     58.31 61.70 .15  55.78 198.61 .14 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     12.06 60.92 .03    617.51** 215.23 1.59 
CT x FM         -1.57 51.35 -.02 
CT x MM         -156.79** 53.84 -1.61 
            
R
2 .09    .13    .28   
R
2
adj .07    .06    .19   
R
2
Change   .09*    .04      .15*   
Overall F   5.06*    1.85      3.03*   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = 
formulative, 1 = manipulative 





 Table 6 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Overall Satisfaction from Mediation Condition and Contextualized Trust 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender .06 .10 .08  .07 .10 .09  .12 .10 .17 
Contexualized Trust (CT)     .09 .09 .14  .12 .09 .18 
Formulative Med. (FM)       .36* .14 .41  .14 .46 .16 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     -.19 .14 -.21    1.02* .50 1.16 
CT x FM         .06 .12 .24 
CT x MM           -.31* .13 -1.42 
            
R
2 .01    .14    .24   
R
2
adj -.01    .07    .15   
R
2
Change .01      .13†      .11†   
Overall F .29    1.93      2.47*   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = 
formulative, 1 = manipulative 





 Table 7 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Pareto Efficiency of Agreements from Mediation Condition and Willingness to 
Concede 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender   96.56* 42.92 .30    94.41* 43.24 .29    83.81* 41.07 .26 
Willingness to Concede (WC)     -48.71 57.25 -.12  -90.66 57.08 -.22 
Formulative Med. (FM)     46.35 64.73 .12  186.42 341.74 .47 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     15.20 61.55 .04    818.92† 420.74 2.11 
WC x FM         -36.15 77.08 -.41 
WC x MM           -168.53† 89.94 -2.06 
            
R
2 .09    .13    .26   
R
2
adj .07    .06    .16   
R
2
Change   .09*    .04      .12*   
Overall F 5.06    1.83      2.64*   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = formulative, 
1 = manipulative 





 Table 8 
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Overall Satisfaction from Mediation Condition and Willingness to Concede 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender .06 .10 .08  .05 .10 .07  .03 .09 .05 
Willingness to Concede (WC)     .19 .13 .21  .09 .13 .10 
Formulative Med. (FM)       .42* .15 .47  .09 .77 .10 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     -.21 .14 -.24    1.87† .95 2.12 
WC x FM         .07 .18 .34 
WC x MM           -.44* .20 -2.38 
            
R
2 .01    .16    .26   
R
2
adj -.01    .09    .16   
R
2
Change .01      .15*      .10†   
Overall F .29      2.27†      2.66*   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = formulative, 
1 = manipulative 





Table 9  
 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Pareto Efficiency of Agreements from Mediation Condition and Openness to 
Mediation 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender   96.56* 42.92 .30    88.84† 44.36 .28    92.09* 42.45 .29 
Openness to Mediation (OM)     -31.74 45.51 -.10  -12.91 44.61 -.04 
Formulative Med. (FM)     66.90 61.79 .17  8.75 255.71 .02 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     14.39 61.93 .04    627.57* 263.11 1.62 
OM x FM         6.13 58.66 .07 
OM x MM           -143.99* 59.28 -1.59 
            
R
2 .09    .13    .24   
R
2
adj .07    .06    .14   
R
2
Change   .09*    .04      .11*   
Overall F   5.06*    1.76      2.39*   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = formulative, 
1 = manipulative 







Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Satisfaction with Outcome from Mediation Condition and Openness to 
Mediation 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender .08 .15 .07  .05 .15 .05  .06 .14 .06 
Openness to Mediation (OM)     -.10 .15 -.10  -.04 .15 -.04 
Formulative Med. (FM)       .46* .20 .36  .42 .85 .33 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     -.30 .20 -.24    1.48† .87 1.18 
OM x FM         -.02 .19 -.05 
OM x MM           -.42* .20 -1.43 
            
R
2 .01    .11    .21   
R
2
adj -.01    .04    .10   
R
2
Change .01    .11      .09†   
Overall F .28    1.52      1.99†   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = formulative, 
1 = manipulative 







Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Pareto Efficiency of Agreements from Mediation Condition and Generalized 
Trust 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender   96.56* 42.92 .30    95.71* 44.05 .30    86.03* 42.61 .27 
Generalized Trust (GT)     2.14 56.89 .01  -4.63 55.58 -.01 
Formulative Med. (FM)     63.83 62.13 .16  71.49 329.36 .18 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     6.23 61.73 .01    782.44* 359.36 2.02 
GT x FM         3.66 73.30 .04 
GT x MM           -175.39* 81.09 -2.06 
            
R
2 .09    .12    .22   
R
2
adj .07    .05    .12   
R
2
Change   .09*    .03      .10†   
Overall F   5.06*    1.62      2.16†   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = 
formulative, 1 = manipulative 







Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Pareto Efficiency of Agreements from Mediation Condition and Cultural 
Intelligence, Motivation Subscale 
 
  Step 1   Step 2   Step 3 
Predictor B SE B β   B SE B β   B SE B β 
Gender   96.56* 42.92 .30  90.76 44.28 .28    92.60* 44.29 .29 
Cultural Intelligence: Motivation (CQM)     38.42 71.37 .08  69.78 74.02 .14 
Formulative Med. (FM)     61.49 61.86 .16  165.80 537.06 .42 
Manipulative Med. (MM)     10.15 61.36 .03  671.32 488.87 1.73 
CQM x FM         -18.89 102.05 -.25 
CQM x MM         -128.14 94.08 -1.72 
            
R
2 .09    .12    .17   
R
2
adj .07    .05    .06   
R
2
Change   .09*    .03    .04   
Overall F 5.06    1.70    1.53   
df 51       48       46     
 
Note: Formulative Med is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 1 = formulative, 0 = manipulative; Manipulative Med  is coded as such: -1 = no mediation, 0 = 
formulative, 1 = manipulative  








Figure 1. Two-way interaction of mediation condition and contextualized trust on 








































































































































































Figure 6. Two-way interaction of mediation condition and openness to mediation on 
























































































































Appendix A  
Disputing Case 
General Information (identical for both participants) 
 
General Study Directions 
Part I 
1. Imagine that you are involved in a heated dispute with your neighbor. You are 
very upset about this difficult dispute. Today you will read about the dispute and the 
issues your and your neighbor disagree about. While you’re reading about the dispute, 
imagine that you are really involved in the disagreement. Think about how you would 
feel if the situation were happening to you in real life. In Part II, you will try to 
negotiate a solution with another participant playing the role of your neighbor.  
 
2. You will be asked to answer some questions about yourself. 
 
PART II 
1. You will be given time to review the story you read in Part I. 
 
2. You will complete a brief questionnaire about the story. 
 
3. You will be given a brief tutorial explaining how you will negotiate with the 
other disputant. 
 
4. The negotiations will begin. You have 28 minutes to negotiate. 
 
5. You will fill out questionnaires about the negotiation, your partner, and 
yourself. 
 










 Oakland Apartments is a small apartment building owned by the Oakland 
Company, a large international shipping firm, which rents out furnished apartments at 
discounted rates to its employees who are assigned to work outside of their home 
country. The building has 8 apartment units, each with a living room, terrace, 
spacious kitchen, large bedroom, and bathroom.  
In front of the building is a parking area for the residents and their guests. There are 
only 10 parking spots, and if those spots are occupied, other residents or guests must 
park on another street about three blocks away from the building and walk. Behind 
the apartment building is a medium sized patio with two small tables and four chairs 
surrounded by a garden. There is also a half-sized basketball court. The complex 
residents are encouraged to use the patio and basketball court for their own enjoyment 
or for entertaining friends. The complex employs a part-time night doorman who 
picks up residents’ garbage from the building’s stairwell at 9:00 pm. 
The building is maintained by a manager, Jordan Smith, who is a friend of the general 
manager of the local Oakland branch. The complex has always been a relatively quiet 
and close-knit community. In general, people have always gotten along and socialized 
with each other, and any problems were usually resolved quickly and amicably. 
However, whenever a problem comes up between residents, Jordan has always 
stepped in to try to solve the conflict. Jordan is an expert mediator. Jordan believes it 
is very important to create a peaceful living environment, and the leaders at the local 
Oakland branch fully support him when he intervenes in a conflict between residents.  
Within the past six months, two new renters have moved into units. When Deniz 
Yenisu, a young woman from Turkey, moved into unit #6, the other residents of 
Oakland Apartments were pleased to meet their friendly and helpful new neighbor. 
The residents were also thrilled when Alex Watkins, a young American woman, 
moved into unit #5.  
Despite the history of friendly neighbor relationships in Oakland Apartments, Deniz 
and Alex always seem to be arguing about something. The conflict really intensified 
when Alex called the police because Deniz's guests were too loud one weeknight. 
Deniz retaliated by sending a letter complaining to Jordan Smith about Alex. The 
other residents don't understand why they can’t get along without bothering the 
building manager - Alex and Deniz just need to find a good compromise.   
 
Additional passage used in both mediated conditions:  
 
Jordan recently became involved in the conflict and is trying to find solution that will 
work for both residents. Because of the problems they were causing in the complex, 
Jordan discussed Alex and Deniz's disagreement with his friend, the general manager 
of the local Oakland branch. The manager told Jordan to do whatever it takes to 
resolve the conflict, and that because Alex and Deniz couldn't reach a solution on 
their own, they need to accept Jordan's help. If they don't come to an agreement, both 
Alex and Deniz will have to go through a costly and time-consuming company 
dispute resolution process.  





Directions: Alex Watkins 
 
In this study, you are going to read about a dispute going on between two neighbors. 
Your role in this situation is that of Alex Watkins. The other study participant will be 
taking on the role of the opposing neighbor, Deniz Yenisu. It is very important that 
you take your role seriously. After you read what is happening in the dispute, 
imagine how you would feel and act if the situation were really happening to 
you. Your goal is to try to come up with a solution to this conflict with your partner 
while also protecting your own interests. As you will read, the dispute has become 
very intense.  
 
Additional passage used in both mediated conditions: 
 
Because the dispute has been impossible to resolve up to this point, a mediator has 
stepped in to help you and your partner come to a solution. It is very common for 
mediators to try to help people in difficult conflicts such as the one you will read 
about. In this study, an expert mediator will try to help you and your partner find the 
best solution. The mediator will watch as you and your partner exchange offers 
during the negotiation. When he thinks of an offer that might interest you and your 
partner, he will send it to you. Even if you and your partner think you may have come 
to an agreement, the mediator might send you another offer if he thinks that you could 
improve your agreement. The mediator will likely contact you every 3-4 minutes 
during your negotiation. Though the mediator is here to help you, you are under no 











You have been selected to take the role of Alex Watkins in the conflict in Oakland 
Apartments. You have five major issues with the neighbor living in the adjacent 
apartment, Deniz Yenisu. Each issue has potential solutions that have been assigned a 
point value. To show the value of each solution to you, we have created a point 
system. Each solution has been assigned a point value. (Additional passage used in 
both mediated conditions): An expert mediator will take on the role of the building 
manager, Jordan Smith, and will try to help you and Deniz come to the best possible 
solution. This mediator will monitor your discussion with Deniz and send you text 
messages with suggestions. 
 
Objective: Your objective is to negotiate a solution with Deniz that gives you the 
highest number of points possible. To earn points, you and Deniz must agree on the 
same solution. While you should try to maximize the number of points you earn, you 
should try to get at least 500 points during the negotiation. There will be a lottery for 
a $200 gift certificate at the end of this study, and you can earn lottery tickets based 
on your performance during the negotiation. If you earn 500 points or less, you will 
receive one lottery ticket. For every 50 points you earn over this 500 point 
benchmark, you will receive an additional ticket to a lottery for a gift certificate. If 
you do not agree on a solution for every issue with Deniz, you will both be subject to 
a costly and time-consuming company dispute resolution process and you will only 
earn 280 points. 
 
The issues: garbage, noise, basketball court use, patio use, and access in and out of 
the parking area 
 
Explanation of Issues and Solutions: 
 
Garbage: Deniz is so uptight about everything! The doorman picks up the residents’ 
garbage from the building stairwell at 9:00 pm every night. You sometimes have to 
work late into the evening at your new job, so you put your trash out when you leave 
in the morning. Deniz told you that the trash stinks, creates an obstacle in the 
stairwell, and that it will attract bugs and mice that would infest the other apartments. 
You’ve tried to tell her that you can’t always get home in time to put your garbage 
out. Her response to your very reasonable scheduling conflicts has been to put your 
trash in front of your door. You don’t understand what her problem is – if you can’t 
get home to put it out in the evening, you have no other choice but to put it out in the 
morning. She keeps telling you that you are disgusting and gross, but now whenever 
she talks to you about the garbage, you just roll your eyes and tell her to lighten up. It 
was annoying enough to deal with her before, but now you’ve found out that she’s 
told the other residents that you have rats and roaches in your apartment because 
you’re unclean. You can’t believe she’s lying to other people in the building – you’ve 
never had a rat or a roach anywhere you’ve lived.  This is really embarrassing. You 




but you definitely can’t come home to take the garbage out any later than that. You 




1. You continue to put your trash in the stairwell in the morning. Points: 200 
2. You agree to buy a special trash can for the hallway so your garbage doesn’t 
smell when you put it out in the morning. Points: 150 
3. You agree to put your trash out at 5:00 pm. Point: 100 
4. You agree to pay the doorman to make another trip to pick up your trash when 
you get home. Points: 50 
5. You agree to always put your trash out only at 8:00 pm or later. Points: 0 
 
Basketball court use: You used to play basketball in high school, and since you 
moved, you’ve started practicing again on the complex court. You practice several 
times a week, but the best time is on Saturday afternoons when you are free to play 
for a long time and can take breaks when you need to. Deniz and her group of Turkish 
friends also want to play basketball on Saturday afternoons. At first, Deniz asked you 
if you wanted to play with her and her friends, but you injured your knee playing in 
high school and are afraid that their rough playing might result in another injury. 
Now, she just orders you off the court when she and her friends want to play. She and 
her friends will even start playing around you when you won’t leave the court, and 
sometimes they “accidentally” bump into you or hit you with their ball. Deniz can’t 
be such a bossy jerk all the time. If you’re on the court first, you should get to 
practice until you’re finished. You’re not going to let her and her stupid friends push 
you around.  
 
Solutions: 
1. You get to continue to use the court for as long as you want on Saturday afternoons. 
Points: 80 
2. You agree to use the court for only two hours on Saturday afternoons. Points: 60 
3. You agree to use the court for only one hour on Saturday afternoons. Points: 40 
4. You agree to leave the court when Deniz and her friends want to use it. Points: 20 
5. You agree not to use the court to practice on Saturday afternoons. Points: 0 
 
Noise: Deniz is so childish! She is always loud late into the night on weeknights. It 
seems like every night, Deniz has guests over to her apartment or on the complex 
patio and they stay until 2:00 am or later! Sometimes, you only get five or six hours 
of sleep because Deniz's noise has kept you up. You even fell asleep at your job last 
week! That's why you called the police on Deniz and her friends. They had the 
television volume cranked up, and they shouted over it whenever they needed to talk. 
How can Deniz be so childish? Normal adults are respectful and recognize that that 
other people might not want to be kept up until all hours of the night. Doesn’t Deniz 
have a job, too? She can’t possibly be doing a good job at work when all she cares 
about is partying. You could probably deal with it if Deniz would quiet down around 





1. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 11:00 pm. Points: 200 
2. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 11:30 pm. Points: 150 
3. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 12:00 am. Points: 100 
4. Deniz agrees to quiet down if you call and ask for less noise. Points: 50 
5. Deniz gets to continue to be loud late into the morning on weeknights. Points: 0 
Patio Use: Deniz is so inconsiderate! She sits out on the patio at night, taking up one 
of the few available chairs. Since you moved to the new area for your job, you have 
met a small group of young Americans who get together in the evening to discuss and 
debate current events, which they often do over coffee, card games, or chess. You 
offered to host the group on the patio at Oakland Apartments. Unfortunately, Deniz 
always hogs one of the chairs that your friends could be sitting in, and often, one of 
your friends has to leave because Deniz won’t give up her chair. You’ve asked Deniz 
nicely if she could just sit on her own terrace, but she sneers at you and makes 
excuses about her terrace being too small. You don’t understand why Deniz needs to 
sit on the patio in the first place – she has a terrace that she could use, and you know 
for a fact that she could fit a table and chair on her own terrace because you have fit 
them on your own terrace.  Deniz is just being a jerk so that you can’t have fun with 
your friends. To get back at her for being such a pain, you’ve starting grabbing her 
chair any time she gets up. If Deniz won’t stop being a brat and use her own terrace, 
your social group will have to find a new place to meet. You like having your new 
friends over and you don’t see why Deniz needs to take up space on the patio when 
she has a perfectly good terrace to sit on.  
Solutions: 
1. Deniz agrees to sit on her terrace and not use the patio at all. Points: 400 
2. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for one hour every other night. Points: 300  
3. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for one hour per night. Points: 200 
4. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for two hours per night.  Points: 100 
5. Deniz continues to relax on the patio whenever she wants.  Points: 0 
Access in and out of the parking area: Deniz and her stupid friends are so selfish! 
You noticed that since Deniz moved in, you were frequently blocked into or out of 
the complex parking area. You suspect that many of the drivers parking illegally in 
the parking area’s entrance are Deniz’s guests. You have been unable to either enter 
or leave the complex on several occasions. One time you even missed a special 
celebratory dinner with your friends because you couldn’t get your car out of the 
parking lot. After you missed the dinner, you asked Deniz to tell her guests to keep 
the entrance to the parking area clear. She said that it wasn’t her guests, and then had 
the nerve to complain that she had seen your guests blocking the entrance. It’s 
definitely not your friends blocking the parking area, and you wouldn’t be surprised if 
Deniz was telling her friends to block the parking just to be annoying. You’ve heard 
that Deniz has been lying to the other residents and saying it is really your friends that 
are blocking the parking area. You have threatened to call the local police department 
to ask them to ticket any cars blocking the entrance, to ask other neighbors to help 




to Deniz to help you to deter people from parking illegally, but she seems to be very 
resistant. 
Solutions 
1. Deniz agrees that you and other residents can call the local police department 
to ticket or tow any cars blocking the entrance.  Points: 120 
2. You both agree to recruit other residents to help you move the car out of the 
entrance.  Points: 90 
3. You both agree to donate some money to install “no parking” signs at the 
entrance of the parking area.  Points: 60 
4. You both agree to go to the building manager and owner to complain about 
being blocked in.  Points: 30 





Summary of Solutions to Issues for Alex Watkins 
 
Garbage: Points: 
1. You continue to put your trash in the stairwell in the morning.  200 
2. You agree to buy a special can for your trash so it doesn’t smell. 150 
3. You agree to put your trash out at 5:00 pm or later. 100 
4. You agree to pay the doorman to make another trip to pick up your trash 
when you get home. 
50 
5. You agree to always put your trash out only at 8:00 pm or later. 0 
  
Basketball Court Use:   
1. You get to continue to use the court for as long as your want on Saturday 
afternoons. 
80 
2. You agree to use the court for only two hours on Saturday afternoons.  60 
3. You agree to use the court for only one hour on Saturday afternoons. 40 
4. You agree to leave the court when Deniz and her friends want to use it. 20 
5. You agree not to use the court to practice on Saturday afternoons. 0 
  
Noise:  
1. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 11:00 pm. 200 
2. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 11:30 pm. 150 
3. Deniz agrees to be quiet after 12:00 am. 100 
4. Deniz agrees to quiet down if you call and ask for less noise. 50 
5. Deniz gets to continue to be loud late into the morning on weeknights. 0 
  
Patio Use:  
1. Deniz agrees to sit on her terrace and not use the patio at all.  400 
2. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for one hour every other night.  300 
3. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for one hour per night. 200 
4. Deniz agrees to only use the patio for two hours per night. 100 
5. Deniz continues to relax on the patio whenever she wants. 0 
  
Parking Lot Access:  
1. Deniz agrees that you and other residents can call the local police 
department to ticket or tow any cars blocking the entrance. 
120 
2. You both agree to recruit other residents to help you move the car out of 
the entrance. 
90 
3. You both agree to donate some money to install “no parking” signs at the 
entrance of the parking area. 
60 
4. You both agree to go to the building manager and owner to complain 
about being blocked in. 
30 
5. Deniz does nothing 0 
 





Additional passage for the manipulative mediation condition: 
The conflict with Deniz has continued for several weeks. Since the two of you cannot 
seem to resolve your differences and your arguments have been negatively affecting 
other tenants at Oakland Apartments, the building manager, Jordan Smith, has 
stepped in to try to help solve the conflict. In the past, Jordan has tried to treat 
disputing tenants fairly while also trying to find an appropriate solution. However, he 
does have some power over the tenants because of his close relationship with the 
owners of the apartments, the Oakland Company. In the past he has had to use several 
methods to encourage disputing tenants to settle their arguments. The following 
options are available to Jordan as he tries to help you and Deniz resolve your 
disagreements. If Jordan chooses to use any of these methods, which he can do at any 
time, points will be taken away from the points you or Deniz earn during the 
negotiation. To show the cost of each of Jordan’s actions, we have created a points 
system.  
Options:  
1. Jordan can put you on probation, so that if you cause more problems, you'll be 
kicked out of the complex. This would embarrass you in front of your friends in the 
complex, since Jordan would have to let everyone living in the apartments know that 
you are on probation and that they should report you if you cause any problems.  
Points: -60 
2. Jordan can inform the Oakland Company that you are creating a problem for the 
community. This would embarrass you in front of your subordinates, colleagues, and 
superiors at work. It could even damage your reputation as a team player on the job, 
and possibly put your job in danger. Points: -90 
3. Jordan can advise the Oakland Company to evict you. The rent at Oakland 
Apartments is significantly lower than it is for other apartments in the area. If you are 
evicted, you will either have to find a new apartment, which will likely cost more 
than you can afford on your current salary, or you will have to leave the area and your 






Player 2 Materials 
 
Directions: Deniz Yenisu 
 
In this study, you are going to read about a dispute going on between two neighbors. 
Your role in this situation is that of Deniz Yenisu. The other study participant will be 
taking on the role of the opposing neighbor, Alex Watkins. It is very important that 
you take your role seriously. After you read what is happening in the dispute, 
imagine how you would feel and act if the situation were really happening to 
you. Your goal is to try to come up with a solution to this conflict with your partner 
while also protecting your own interests. As you will read, the dispute has become 
very intense.  
 
Additional passage used in both mediated conditions: 
 
Because the dispute has been impossible to resolve up to this point, a mediator has 
stepped in to help you and your partner come to a solution. It is very common for 
mediators to try to help people in difficult conflicts such as the one you will read 
about. In this study, an expert mediator will try to help you and your partner find the 
best solution. The mediator will watch as you and your partner exchange offers 
during the negotiation. When he thinks of an offer that might interest you and your 
partner, he will send it to you. Even if you and your partner think you may have come 
to an agreement, the mediator might send you another offer if he thinks that you could 
improve your agreement. The mediator will likely contact you every 3-4 minutes 
during your negotiation. Though the mediator is here to help you, you are under no 










You have been selected to take the role of Deniz Yenisu in the conflict in Oakland 
Apartments. You have five major issues with the neighbor living in the adjacent 
apartment, Alex Watkins. Each issue has potential solutions that have been assigned a 
point value. To show the value of each solution to you, we have created a point 
system. Each solution has been assigned a point value. (Additional passage used in 
both mediated conditions): An expert mediator will take on the role of the building 
manager, Jordan Smith, and will try to help you and Alex come to the best possible 
solution. This mediator will monitor your discussion with Alex and send you text 
messages with suggestions. 
 
Objective: Your objective is to negotiate a solution with Alex that gives you the 
highest number of points possible. To earn points, you and Alex must agree on the 
same solution. While you should try to maximize the number of points you earn, you 
should try to get at least 500 points during the negotiation. There will be a lottery for 
a $200 gift certificate at the end of this study, and you can earn lottery tickets based 
on your performance during the negotiation. If you earn 500 points or less, you will 
receive one lottery ticket. For every 50 points you earn over this 500 point 
benchmark, you will receive an additional ticket to a lottery for a gift certificate. If 
you do not agree on a solution for every issue with Alex, you will both be subject to a 
costly and time-consuming company dispute resolution process and you will only 
earn 280 points.  
 
The issues: garbage, noise, basketball court use, patio use, and access in and out of 
the parking area 
 
Explanation of Issues and Solutions:  
 
Garbage: Alex is just lazy! The doorman picks up the residents’ garbage from the 
complex stairwell every evening at 9:00 pm, and most residents put their garbage in 
the stairwell around 8:00 pm. Alex puts her garbage out early every morning and just 
leaves it in the stairwell all day. You told Alex that not only does her trash stink and 
create a dangerous obstacle in the stairway, but you're also worried that it will attract 
bugs or mice that will infest the surrounding apartments. You don’t understand how 
Alex can be so disgusting, putting out her trash so that everyone has to look at it and 
smell it. She’s just gross! You’ve gotten so sick of it that you’ve been taking her trash 
and putting it in front of her door, just so she realizes how revolting it is when she 
leaves her trash in the stairwell. You would like her to put her trash out as close to 
pickup time as possible, and she definitely needs to stop putting it out in the morning.  
 
Solutions: 
1. Alex agrees to always put her trash out at 8:00 pm or later. Points: 200 
2. Alex agrees to pay the doorman to make another trip to pick up her trash when 




3. Alex agrees to put her trash out at 5:00 pm or later. Points: 100 
4. Alex agrees to buy a special trash can for the hallway so her garbage doesn’t 
smell when she puts it out in the morning. Points: 50 
5. Alex continues to put her trash in the stairwell in the morning. Points: 0 
 
Basketball court use: You have loved playing basketball since you were a child. 
You’ve found a group of young Turks in your new city that like to play on Saturday 
afternoons. You invited everyone to play on the court at Oakland Apartments. 
Unfortunately, Alex wants to use the court at the same time.  She’s usually on the 
court for a long time, but most of the time she’s just messing around or “taking a 
break,” as she calls it. You asked if she wanted to play with your group, but she 
sneered at you and turned you down. After that, you started asking her to leave the 
court when your group wants to play, but she refuses and argues that she has a right to 
practice for as long as she wants. She’s being ridiculous. She calls it “practicing” but 
really she’s just standing around trying to take up the court so you and your friends 
can’t use it. You and your group have just started to play even when she’s on the 
court – usually, you can annoy her enough to make her leave. You think Alex should 
leave the court open on Saturday afternoons, or at least give it up when you and your 
friends want to play basketball. After all, it’s silly for one person to take up the court 
to practice when several other people want to play a game.  
Solutions: 
1. Alex agrees not to use the court to practice on Saturday afternoons. Points: 400 
2. Alex agrees to leave the court when you and your friends want to use it. Points: 300 
3. Alex agrees to use the court for only one hour on Saturday afternoons. Points: 200 
4. Alex agrees to use the court for only two hours on Saturday afternoons. Points: 100 
5. Alex continues to use the court for as long as she wants on Saturday afternoons. 
Points: 0 
 
Noise: Alex constantly complains that you are loud late at night on weeknights. You 
have been very lonely since you moved for work, and having friends over always 
makes you feel better. You usually like to have your friends over later in the evening, 
after you've had some time to relax. You always try to keep the noise to a reasonable 
level, but Alex has been whining about the noise since you moved in. Alex wants you 
to be quiet after 11:00 pm, but you think that’s absurd. Who even goes to bed that 
early? Alex even called the police one night when you had your friends over, but they 
just told you to try to get along with your neighbors. The police didn’t think you were 
being so loud, so clearly Alex is just being a brat. She’s even spreading lies about you 
and your friends to other residents, claiming that you’re immature and that you and 
your friends stay up all night partying. This is just humiliating. If she can’t handle a 
reasonable amount of noise, she should just grow up and get some headphones or 
earplugs. You refuse to change your behavior because there’s nothing wrong with it. 
You have a right to have friends over, and you and your guests aren’t that loud.  
 
Solutions: 
1. You get to continue to be loud late into the morning on weeknights. Points: 
200 




3. You agree to be quiet after 12:00 am. Points: 100 
4. You agree to be quiet after 11:30 pm. Points: 50 
5. You agree to be quiet after 11:00 pm. Points: 0 
 
Patio use: Alex is such a jerk! You enjoy sitting on the patio in the evenings when 
the weather is nice. However, Alex has ruined your ability to enjoy your relaxation. 
She is a member of some small group of young Americans who get together to 
socialize and play cards or chess. Alex’s friends are rowdy, loud, and inappropriate. 
They get together just to argue and shout about things, and they have even tried to get 
you to abandon your chair so that they can all sit around the tables to play cards. One 
time, they stole your chair after you got up to get a cup of tea, even though you left 
your book on it. They refused to give it back once you returned. Alex has told you 
that you are only entitled to a certain amount of time using the patio and that you 
should just sit on your terrace. You refuse to give in. The patio is for everyone in the 
complex to use, and your terrace isn’t big enough for a table and chair. You think 
Alex is being unfair, and you’re going to take a stand to make her and her friends 
should respect your desire to relax on the patio. 
 
Solutions: 
1. You continue to relax on the patio when you want.  Points: 80 
2. You agree to only use the patio for two hours per night.  Points: 60 
3. You agree to only use the patio for one hour per night. Points: 40 
4. You agree to only use the patio for one hour every other night. Points: 20  
5. You agree to sit on your terrace and not use the patio at all. Points: 0 
 
Access in and out of the parking area: Alex and her stupid friends are so selfish! 
You noticed that since Alex moved in, you were frequently blocked into or out of the 
complex parking area. You suspect that many of the drivers parking illegally in the 
parking area’s entrance are Alex’s guests. You have been unable to either enter or 
leave the complex on several occasions. One time you even missed an important work 
dinner because you couldn’t get your car out of the parking lot. After you missed the 
dinner, you asked Alex to tell her guests to keep the entrance to the parking area 
clear. She said that it wasn’t her guests, and then had the nerve to complain that she 
had seen your guests blocking the entrance. It’s definitely not your friends blocking 
the parking area, and you wouldn’t be surprised if Alex was telling her friends to 
block the parking just to be annoying. You’ve heard that Alex has been lying to the 
other residents and saying it is really your friends that are blocking the parking area. 
You have threatened to call the local police department to ask them to ticket any cars 
blocking the entrance, to ask other neighbors to help move the offending vehicles, or 
to place “no parking” signs at the entrance. You want to Alex to help you to deter 
people from parking illegally, but she seems to be very resistant. 
 
Solutions:  
1. Alex agrees that you and other residents can call the local police department 




2. You both agree to recruit other residents to help you move the car out of the 
entrance.  Points: 90 
3. You both agree to donate some money to install “no parking” signs at the 
entrance of the parking area.  Points: 60 
4. You both agree to go to the building manager and owner to complain about 
being blocked in.  Points: 30 











Summary of Solutions to Issues for Deniz Yenisu 
 
Garbage Points 
1.  Alex agrees to always put her trash out at 8:00 pm or later. 200 
2. Alex agrees to pay the doorman to make another trip to pick up her 
trash when she gets home. 
150 
3. Alex agrees to put her trash out at 5:00 pm or later. 100 
4. Alex agrees to buy a special can for her trash so it doesn’t smell. 50 
5. Alex continues to put her trash in the stairwell in the morning. 0 
  
Basketball Court Use:   
1. Alex agrees not to use the court to practice on Saturday afternoons. 400 
2. Alex agrees to leave the court when you and your friends want to use 
it.  
300 
3. Alex agrees to use the court for only one hour on Saturday afternoons. 200 
4. Alex agrees to use the court for only two hours on Saturday afternoons. 100 





1. You get to continue to be loud late into the morning on weekends. 200 
2. You agree to quiet down if Alex calls and asks for less noise. 150 
3. You agree to be quiet after 12:00 am. 100 
4. You agree to be quiet after 11:30 pm. 50 
5. You agree to be quiet after 11:00 pm. 0 
  
Patio Use:  
1. You continue to relax on the patio when you want. 80 
2. You agree to only use the patio for two hours per night. 60 
3. You agree to only use the patio for one hour per night. 40 
4. You agree to only use the patio for one hour every other night. 20 
5. You agree to sit on your terrace and not use the patio at all. 0 
  
Parking Lot Access:   
1. Alex agrees that you and other residents can call the local police 
department to ticket or tow any cars blocking the entrance. 
120 
2. You both agree to recruit other residents to help you move the car out 
of the entrance. 
90 
3. You both agree to donate some money to install “no parking” signs at 
the entrance of the parking area. 
60 
4. You both agree to go to the building manager and owner to complain 
about being blocked in. 
30 
5. Alex does nothing.  0 
  





Additional passage for the manipulative mediation condition: 
The conflict with Alex has continued for several weeks. Since the two of you cannot 
seem to resolve your differences and your arguments have been negatively affecting 
other tenants at Oakland Apartments, the building manager, Jordan Smith, has 
stepped in to try to help solve the conflict. In the past, Jordan has tried to treat 
disputing tenants fairly while also trying to find an appropriate solution. However, he 
does have some power over the tenants because of his close relationship with the 
owners of the apartments, the Oakland Company. In the past he has had to use several 
methods to encourage disputing tenants to settle their arguments. The following 
options are available to Jordan as he tries to help you and Alex resolve your 
disagreements. If Jordan chooses to use any of these methods, which he can do at any 
time, points will be taken away from the points you or Alex earn during the 
negotiation. To show the cost of each of Jordan’s actions, we have created a points 
system.  
Options:  
1. Jordan can put you on probation, so that if you cause more problems, you'll be 
kicked out of the complex. This would embarrass you in front of your friends in the 
complex, since Jordan would have to let everyone living in the apartments know that 
you are on probation and that they should report you if you cause any problems.  
Points: -60 
2. Jordan can inform the Oakland Company that you are creating a problem for the 
community. This would embarrass you in front of your subordinates, colleagues, and 
superiors at work. It could even damage your reputation as a team player on the job, 
and possibly put your job in danger. Points: -90 
3. Jordan can advise the Oakland Company to evict you. The rent at Oakland 
Apartments is significantly lower than it is for other apartments in the area. If you are 
evicted, you will either have to find a new apartment, which will likely cost more 
than you can afford on your current salary, or you will have to leave the area and your 
job. Points: -130 
Appendix B 
Part I Survey 
 
Generalized Trust Scale (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) 
 








2.  What is your age?  _______ 
3.  What is your nationality?    ____________________________ 
4.  What is your marital status?  (please circle one) 
_____Single ______Engaged _____Married _____Separated _____Divorced _____Widowed 
 
5.  In your opinion, what socio-economic class do you belong to?  (Please circle one) 
Upper upper (e.g., rich, influential, highly educated) 
Lower upper (e.g., professionals, such as physicians, lawyers; owner of a major business) 
Upper middle (e.g., professionals, such as teachers, social workers; owner of a good 
business; owner of a large farm) 
Lower middle (e.g., clerical, small entrepreneurs; farmer) 
Upper lower (e.g., skilled worker, small farmer) 
Lower 
lower 









Planned behavior scale 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS: 
For the following questions, please place an X on the line that best corresponds to 
your opinion.   
 
































































































































































































































Scale measuring reactions to the disputing case 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements, using the scale below: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly      Neither agree                      Strongly                              
disagree       nor disagree                         agree 
 
1. I want the mediator to get involved in this 
dispute. 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
2. I identify with role of Tyler in this dispute. 1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
3. I think the issues in this case are realistic. 1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
4. This negotiation is important to me. 1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
5. I feel that I can depend on Alex to have my 
best interests at heart during this negotiation. 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
6. I feel like my honor has been violated in this 
situation. 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
7. I feel like my reputation has been damaged 
in this situation. 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7 
8. I feel like my rights have been violated in 
this situation. 










Mediation Condition Manipulation Check Items 
 
Did a mediator send you messages during your negotiation?  Yes   No 
 
Please think about what the mediator did during the negotiation, and indicate the 
extent to which you think the mediator engaged in the following behaviors using the 
scale provided.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Strongly      Neither agree                      Strongly                              
disagree       nor disagree                         agree 
 
During the negotiation, the mediator…  
1. Suggested offers for Alex and I to 
consider 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7       
2. Tried to push Alex and I to accept his 
proposals 
1      2      3     4     5      6      7       
3. Threatened to punish Alex and I 1      2      3     4     5      6      7       
 
















Mediator Introductions and Messages 
 
Formulative Mediator Introduction: 
Hello, my name is Jordan. I understand that the two of you have been having a 
conflict and have been unable to resolve it. I am the building manager and will try to 
help facilitate an agreement between the two of you today. Please go ahead and begin 
discussing the situation. I will send suggestions throughout your discussion. 
 
Manipulative Mediator Introduction: 
Hello, I'm taking the role of Jordan Smith, the building manager of Oakland 
Apartments. I am going to try to help the two of you find a solution to the conflict 
that you are having. I'm going to be watching as the two of you discuss potential 
solutions. If I can think of a solution that I think would work for the two of you, I'll 
send you a message. If I think that one or both of you are not cooperating, I have 
several options to push you to come to an agreement. I can put you on probation, tell 
my friends at the Oakland Company that you are a troublemaker, or advise the 
Oakland Company to evict you from the Oakland Apartments. If I decide to use any 
of these tactics, points will be taken away from your final score. I hope there will be 
no need for me to impose these sanctions. 
 
Sample Mediator Proposal Message: 
I believe you could achieve a high score on the Patio issue, if you would be willing to 
compromise on the Basketball Court issue. Please look at the following solution: 
Noise: 
Patio: Tyler will not use the patio. 
Garbage:  
Basketball: Alex will not use the court on Saturday. 
Parking: 
 
Sample Manipulative Mediator Threat Message: 
You are not cooperative. You made too many bad offers. I can put you on probation, 
so that if you cause more problems, you'll be kicked out of the complex. This would 
embarrass you in front of your friends in the complex, since I would have to let 
everyone living in the apartments know that you are on probation and that they should 
report you if you cause any problems. Points: -60 
 
Sample Manipulative Mediator Punishment Message: 
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